

























Managerial Overconfidence and Corporate Investment Decisions 

























              
Acknowledgement 
 
I would like to thank my supervisors: Dr. Helen Roberts from The University of Otago; 
Dr. Eric Tan from The University of Queensland and Professor He, Ren from Shanghai 
University of Finance and Economics for the patient guidance, encouragement and advice she 
/ he has provided throughout my time as their student. I have been extremely lucky to have 
three supervisors who cared so much about my work, and who responded to my questions and 
queries so promptly and professionally. I would also like to thank all the members of DBA team 








Managerial overconfidence refers to a manager’s strong belief in their management ability, their 
ability to choose better investment opportunities, and the richness of their perceived knowledge 
level. That is, overconfident managers consistently assess opportunities as being of higher value 
than the actual situation because of managerial psychological bias, commonly referred to as 
managerial overconfidence. This thesis uses Overconfidence Theory to study the investment 
decision-making of Listed Companies in China.The analysis looks at the M&A events in the 
A-share market of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from January 1, 2012 to December 
31, 2013 to investigate the behavior of managerial investment choices. The results show that, 
consistent with the theory of managerial overconfidence, overconfident Chinese managers 
demonstrate a positive association with the scale of investment and level of corporate 
overinvestment. In particular, the evidence suggests that firms with higher free cash flows and 
overconfident managers are associated with significantly higher levels of investment activity. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Research background 
Since the 1980s, with the rise of behavioral finance theory, corporate finance research has begun 
to recognize that irrationality of managers and investors may affect corporate decision-making 
and asset pricing. Psychological research results have been applied to corporate finance 
research, and behavioral corporate finance theory has gradually formed. According to the 
classification of Shefrin (2001), Behavioral Corporate Finance Theory considers the effect of 
two irrationalities on corporate financial decision-making. The first assumes that investors are 
irrational, that is, capital market arbitrage is not complete, the price may be high or low 
(mispricing) relative to the fair value. Rational managers recognize price deviation and make 
financial decisions. Rational managers’ decisions may be to maximize the short-term or the 
long-term value of the company. The second is to pay attention to the irrationality of managers, 
which mainly studies the influence of managers’ psychological and behavioral deviation on 
financial decision-making under the premise of investors' rationality. 
Traditional corporate finance theory holds that rational managers should make financial 
decisions to maximize the value of the company, so as to achieve effective allocation of 
resources. However, agency theory points out that the separation of ownership and management 
rights and the decentralization of external equity make it very difficult to monitor managers 
effectively, which leads managers to make some financial decisions that are not conducive to 
maximizing the value of their own company. Different from agency theory, behavioral 
corporate finance theory explores managers’ financial decision-making behavior from the 




irrational managers’ starting point for making financial decisions is to maximize the value of 
the company. However, psychological or cognitive biases affect their judgment, which impairs 
their ability to make correct financial decisions. These wrong decisions will damage the value 
of the company and the interests of shareholders, but this is not the result of the difference of 
interests between managers and investors, but the error caused by the deviation of managers’ 
own behavior, that is to say, the decision-making cost cannot be resolved by designing an 
incentive mechanism (Shefrin, 2001). 
The classical hypothesis of corporate finance theory is the economic rationality of the behavior, 
but whether the reality of China meets this hypothesis remains to be discussed. On the one hand, 
as an emerging market, China's capital market is still in the stage of maturity, market efficiency 
is not high, and there are many irrational elements to investors’ behavior. For example, a large 
number of investors are keen on short-term speculative profits rather than long-term 
investments based on the company's value. On the other hand, there are distortions in the 
selection mechanism of managers of Listed Companies in China, especially in state-owned 
enterprises. These distortions lead to the lack of managerial ability and economic rationality of 
managers in addition to serious agency problems. The practice of reform and opening up in 
China for more than 30 years has brought up a large number of entrepreneurs, but it has also 
created soil for the irrationality of managers (represented by overconfidence). 
First, the influence of Chinese traditional culture tends to make enterprise managers 
overconfident. Confucianism, which has been influencing China for thousands of years, still 
occupies an important position in modern enterprise management culture in China. The idea of 
“Class concept” advocated by Confucian culture is deeply rooted in Chinese enterprises. In 
most organizations, "leaders" have absolute authority. Lack of democratic decision-making 
concept and excessive emphasis on the absolute authority of leaders make top managers of 
enterprises usually have high status and decision-making power, which easily breeds managers’ 
overconfidence. 
Second, managers of successful enterprises tend to become overconfident. Over the past 30 




state-owned enterprises, and private enterprises have emerged in China. The managers of these 
successful enterprises have played an immeasurable role in leading the old state-owned 
enterprises out of the predicament, helping the new state-owned enterprises to stand firm, and 
promoting the rapid development of private enterprises. They have been given the title of "pride 
of the times". Years of successful management have accumulated a lot of successful experience 
for them, while at the same time deepening their overconfidence. 
Finally, the specific background during China's economic transition provides an external 
environment for Chinese business managers to develop overconfidence. After more than 30 
years of reform and opening up, China's economic environment has undergone fundamental 
changes, but on the whole, it is still not mature and perfect. From an outward perspective 
enterprise, various laws and regulations have not been perfected, and effective external 
supervision mechanism has not yet formed. From an internal point of view, the internal 
governance structure of enterprises is not scientific and reasonable; especially the restriction 
mechanism for managers is not perfect. At the same time, the leadership of a large number of 
state-owned enterprises faces strong bureaucracy, and the management of private enterprises is 
still dominated by family management. 
In short, in the case of an imperfect legal system and lack of restraint mechanism, many years 
of successful experience will make business managers overestimate their experience and 
management ability, which will easily breed their psychological bias of overconfidence. 
The behavioral corporate finance theory relaxes the hypothesis of rational economics and 
combines corporate finance theory with behavioral finance theory. Its hypotheses relate more 
close to the reality of the capital market, while varying in line with the business realities all 
surrounded by the special background that is the current state of the Chinese economy. 
Therefore, the behavioral corporate finance theory, especially the managerial overconfidence 
theory, provides us with a new way to study the financial decision-making of listed companies 





1.2 Purpose and significance of research 
Through the analysis of China's actual situation, we can see that if we ignore the influence of 
irrational behavior of Chinese business managers and simply rely on the classical framework 
of corporate finance theory to study the financial decision-making problems of Chinese 
companies, it will be difficult to overcome the problem of unsatisfactory premises and 
assumptions. This approach also makes it difficult to get a satisfactory conclusion. 
The behavioral corporate finance theory, especially the branch of studies examining manager 
irrationality, fully considers the influence of managers’ overconfident behavior on the 
company's financial decisions. This is very relevant to managerial practice in China. The 
literature review also docements a large number of theoretical and empirical studies in China 
and abroad that show that managers’ over-confident behavior does have an important impact 
on the company's financial decision-making. 
Therefore, this DBA thesis examines the relationship between manager overconfidence and 
investment decision-making. The idea is motivated by observations from working in the 
Chinese financial sector. China’s capital market is dominated by policy guidance from the state 
and functions in a macro-regulated market. This is a very challenging environment for 
entrepreneurial business practice. It is probable that corporate investment decisions will be 
heavily influenced by changing government policies.  
In 2012 and 2013, after several consecutive years of economic downturn, the Chinese 
government issued two new policy directives: (1) "Implementation Opinions on Encouraging 
and Guiding Private Enterprises to Actively Invest Overseas"1 and (2) "Guiding Opinions on 
Accelerating the Merger and Reorganization of Enterprises in Key Industries"2. In addition, the 
suspension by China Securities Regulatory Commission of all Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) 
in 2013 further promoted the development of the Merger & Acquisition (M&A) market. This 
study uses information about the amount of M&A activity in the Chinese market to empirically 
investigate this special period of business development in the Chinese capital market. 
 
1 http://www.china.com.cn/policy/txt/2012-07/04/content_25802549_2.htm   




Specifically, the thesis asks the question: How does managerial overconfidence affect 
managerial investment decisions? 
My employer is a private equity investment company in Shenzhen that mainly invests in 
technology projects and growth companies in certain industries. The profit objective is achieved 
by investing across projects in various industries at different stages so as to achieve target 
returns and diversify risks. Each investment requires due diligence concerning the target 
company’s assets and liabilities, business and financial conditions, legal relationships, 
opportunities, and potential risks faced by the target company. The information is submitted to 
the investment committee for careful consideration prior to making the investment decision. 
During the diligence process, I discovered that management team behavior was not examined. 
In particular, as an investor, my company wanted information about management team 
overconfidence, mainly manifested in self-attribution (Bettman & Weitz, 1983), control 
hallucinations, knowledge hallucinations (March & Shapira, 1987) and excessive optimism of 
the enterprise (Barros & Silveira, 2007). These psychological deviations had the potential to 
affect the investment value, however they are difficult to estimate directly. In theory, 
overconfidence and its manifestation in managerial decision making is an important factor that 
can influence investment outcomes ( Shefrin, 2001). Hence, an empirical study examining the 
association identified in the behavioral finance literature on the effect of managerial 
overconfidence on performance outcomes can better inform choices made by the firm when 
undertaking comprehensive investment analysis in practice. The goal is to identify quality 
investment opportunities after taking into consideration traits associated with the management 
team that can provide information about overconfidence or other deviations attributed to 






1.3 Research Content and Structure 
1.3.1 Research content 
This study proposes a measure of managerial overconfidence, which is not only in line with the 
principles of psychology and behavioral finance, but also consistent with the reality of the 
Chinese business environment. On the basis of reviewing and evaluating the indicators of 
managerial overconfidence proposed by prior literature, this paper creates a new measurement 
index that defines an overconfident manager as one whose firm completes two or more M&As 
in one year. The definition is taken from the study by Doukas and Petmezas (2007), and 
combines evidence from the psychology and behavioral finance theory with the observed 
practice of Chinese listed companies. The purpose of this study is to empirically tests the 
association between overinvestment and managerial overconfidence based on the index. The 
research contributes to the literature with a specific focus on Chinese firms facing new 
government controls for period 2012-2013.  
In contrast with most of the existing studies on behavioral corporate finance that test data on 
capital markets of western developed countries, this study applies behavioral corporate finance 
theory to managerial overconfidence in China. However, China's capital market is still 
developing and therefore does not conform to the assumptions of a ‘perfect capital market’. The 
governance structure of listed companies is still developing, and the reform of state-owned 
enterprises, especially the selection and supervision mechanism of managers of state-owned 
enterprises, is still in progress. Whether the managerial overconfidence hypothesis can explain 
the investment decision-making behavior of Listed Companies in China is still an open 
empirical question. This paper uses empirical models to examine the association between the 
investment decision-making behavior of Chinese listed companies and managerial 
overconfidence. The results contribute to the field of behavioral corportate finance, but also 





1.3.2 Research Structure 
The full text consists of six chapters: 
The first chapter is an introduction, which mainly introduces the background, significance, 
content and structure of this study. 
Chapter 2 provides the theoretical basis and literature review. This chapter introduces the theory 
of managerial overconfidence and reviews the extant literature. It can be seen that introducing 
managerial overconfidence into corporate finance research makes the research hypothesis more 
pragmatic, and draws many very usefulconclusions. The evidence suggests that managerial 
overconfidence is related to corporate investment decisions. These studies expand the corporate 
finance body of knowledge and also enrich corporate finance research methods. It is certainly 
the case that more work can be done to better understand these relationships in the context of 
an important growing market such as China. 
Chapter 3 summarizes the corporate governance and investment behavior of listed companies 
in China. This chapter analyses the connotation of managerial overconfidence for listed 
companies in China that impact on corporate investment behavior. 
Chapter 4 reports the empirical models used to examine the effect of managerial overconfidence 
on corporate investment decision-making for listed companies in China. 
Chapter 5 reports the main results. The research hypothesis is validated from three aspects: the 
impact of managerial overconfidence on the scale of investment, the impact of managerial 
overconfidence on the level of corporate overinvestment, and the association between 
overconfident managers’ investment behavior and investment cash flow sensitivity. 
Chapter 6 is a case study that considers the problem of CEO overconfidence. 
Chapter 7 pilot study（30 firms）conducts a robustness test of the relation between manager 
overconfidence and firm over-investment by using the executive compensation as a second 
proxy to measure managers' over-confidence. 
Chapter 8 summarizes the research in this paper, points out the shortcomings of the research, 
and looks forward to further research in the future. 


































1.4 Research innovations 
First, by examining the extant literature together with reference to the research ideas of Doukas 
and Petmezas (2007), combined with the actual situation of China's capital market and listed 
companies, this paper uses an index of managerial overconfidence for listed companies in China. 
Introduction 
Literature review Theoretical basis 
Analysis of Corporate Governance and Investment Behavior of Chinese Listed Companies 
Empirical analysis 
The Impact of Manager 
Overconfidence on Investment 
Cash Flow Sensitivity  
The Impact of Manager 
Overconfidence on the 
Investment Scale of 
Companies 
Research Deficiencies, Summary and Prospects 









Firms that undertake at least two M&As in a year are used to identify overconfident managers.  
Second, this study reports evidence that suggests that the financial decision-making behavior 
of Chinese listed companies is related to managerial overconfidence. The results add to the 
behavioral finance literature. In addition, the findings also add to our understanding about the 




Chapter 2: Manager Overconfidence Theory 
and Literature Review 
 
2.1 Overconfidence of Managers 
2.1.1 Definition 
Overconfidence is a kind of deviation caused by people's inadequate understanding of their 
abilities and knowledge. People who are overconfident in their abilities always judge 
themselves better than they really are (Shefrin, 2007). People who are overconfident in their 
knowledge always feel that they know a lot, but in fact they do not (Shefrin, 2007). People with 
overconfident psychological bias show excessive optimism and confidence in their abilities, 
knowledge, and future predictions. 
Psychological research shows that overconfidence is one of the main psychological 
characteristics that influence the decision-making of the subject’s behavior after relaxing the 
"rational person" hypothesis. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) noted that perhaps the most robust 
finding in the psychological study of people's judgment and decision-making is that people tend 
to be overconfident. De Bondt et and Thaler (1985) cite evidence to show that people are 
overconfident in estimating the probability of uncertain events when making decisions. 
Overconfidence is almost one of the most ingrained psychological characteristics of human 
beings.  
This thesis considers managerial overconfidence in terms of those managers who are 
overconfident in their management ability. Specifically, it refers to a manager’s ability to 
choose better investment opportunities, and a manager’s knowledge level, that is, overconfident 
managers judgment is always better than reality because of their psychological bias. Many 
studies on psychology and behavioral economics have shown that most people are 
overconfident and managers are expecially overconfident. Gervais and Odean (2002) document 
that managers, especially senior managers, are more likely to be overconfident. In the selection 




comprehensive understanding of managers natural behavioural biases. This selective bias 
makes overconfident people more likely to become managers. Indeed, enterprise managers are 
typically successful individuals. In particular, given self-attribution bias, they are more likely 
to have a tendency to be overconfident. Psychological and behavioral economics research 
examining the characteristics of corporate managers’ overconfidence provides a theoretical 
basis for the study of corporate financial decision-making behavior from the perspective of 
managers' irrationality. This literature contains direct evidence for the managers’ 
overconfidence hypothesis found in behavioral corporate finance. Langer (1975) and Weinstein 
(1980) report that managers’ overconfidence is a more serious issue than ordinary employees 
overconfidence. Russo and Schoemaker (1992) found that most managers overestimate the 
profitability of the enterprise and their own business ability. Langer (1975), Weinstein (1980) , 
March and Shapira (1987) also report that managers seriously overestimated the likelihood of 
successful investment projects. 
2.1.2 Manifestations 
The main manifestations of managers’ overconfidence are self-attribution, control hallucination, 
arrogance, and over-optimism. 
(1) Self-attribution. Self-attribution refers to the fact that people tend to attribute success to their 
abilities and failure to bad luck and other reasons. Bettman and Weitz (1983) found that when 
analyzing annual financial reports, managers attributed the rise in corporate performance to 
their excellent ability, while the decline in corporate performance was caused by external 
factors. 
(2) Control hallucinations. Control hallucination refers to the overestimation of people's ability 
to control the results of uncertain events: when people take some actions to control the results, 
some control actions have nothing to do with how the results are. For example, people think 
that their own lottery has a higher chance of winning than the randomly distributed lottery. In 
fact, there is no difference between the two ways of winning the lottery, and the behavior of 
drawing the lottery itself will not have any impact on the results. Langer (1975), Weinstein 




power are more likely to have control illusions and to seriously underestimate the likelihood of 
project failure. 
(3) Arrogance (Roll, 1986). Arrogance is used to describe people that often overestimate the 
accuracy of their knowledge and the accuracy of their judgment of uncertain events. Russo and 
Shoemaker (1992) found that professional managers also demonstrate the characteristics of 
high estimation accuracy. 
(4) Excessive optimism (Barros & Silverira, 2007). Excessive optimism is the situation where 
people overestimate the possibility of favorable events and underestimate the possibility of 
adverse events. According to the survey, about 90% of people think they are better than average 
in driving skills and sense of humor. Cooper, Woo and Dunkellberg (1998) surveyed 2,994 
entrepreneurs and found that 81% of them thought their business was more likely to have the 
70% chance to survive, and 33% of the entrepreneurs thought their business would survive 
without any issues. In fact, 75% of enterprises have a life span of less than five years. 
2.1.3 Measurements 
Based on the existing literature, there are seven measurements that have been used to estimate 
managerial investment overconfidence. 
1. Changes in stocks or equity held by managers during their tenure: 
According to the theory proposed by Malmendier and Tate (2005), managerial shareholding 
level can be used as a measure of managerial overconfidence. Specifically, when the manager’s 
shareholding status in the enterprise increases habitually, the manager is defined as 
overconfident. Malmendier and Tate (2005) argue that when managers are rational, there will 
be a situation where the shares are appropriately reduced. Rational managers will not increase 
their shareholding when the price is higher, and do not demonstrate an overly optimistic or self-
confident bullish attitude towards their company. 
2. Manager's earnings forecast deviation 
The profit forecast level measurement method refers to the comparison between the annual 
profit level predicted by the manager and the actual annual profit level. If the predicted value 




level and the judgment on the company's situation deviates. This kind of cognitive deviation 
can be used to determine if a manager is overconfident. The greater the gap between the 
predicted situation and the actual situation, the higher the degree of managerial overconfidence 
(Lin, Hu, and Chen, 2005) Overconfidence increases managers’ optimism about future 
forecasts, and overconfidence leads to biased earnings forecasts. 
3. Relative salary of managers 
Hayward and Hambrick (1997) note that managers’ compensation may also influence 
managerial overconfidence. Specifically, for the same category of manager, when manager 
salary is in the upper middle level, the higher the salary, the higher the importance in the 
company, the easier it is to become overconfident. Therefore,the manager's salary level can be 
used to evaluate managerial overconfidence. 
4. Consumer sentiment index 
Oliver (2005), a professor at the University of Michigan, interviewed American consumers 
through regular phone calls to investigate consumers’questions about the expected changes in 
the current and next year ’s economic situation. The data was scored according to consumers’ 
answers which was then used to calculate consumers Sentiment index. If the consumer 
sentiment index is high, it indicates that consumers have good expectations about the future. 
The improvement of the consumer confidence index leads the managers have an optimistic 
attitude towards the company's future development, and implies managerial overconfidence. 
5. Business Climate Index 
The Business Climate Index was first used by the Chinese scholar Yu Minggui et al. (2006) to 
apply the enterprise prosperity index published by the National Bureau of Statistics as a 
substitute measure of managerial overconfidence. The index is compiled by the National 
Bureau of Statistics on the basis of the comprehensive judgment of entrepreneurs on the current 
production and operation status of enterprises and the expectations of future industry 
development and changes. Index values of more than 100 are indicative of overconfident 
managers. When the index is less than 100, managers are deemed to be pessimistic. However, 




development prosperity, and the quarterly industry prosperity index released by the National 
Bureau of Statistics does not reflect the degree of overconfidence of a particular company 
manager. 
6. Evaluation of managers by mainstream media 
Hayward and Hambrick (1997) collected reports on the evaluation of CEOs from influential 
financial newspapers and periodicals in the United States, and scored the CEOs of the study 
using textual analysis. Identifying words such as "optimistic", "confident", "bold" and other 
descriptions, were used to determine overconfident managers.Words such as "pessimistic", 
"conservative" and "cautious", were used to classify managers as not overconfident 
7. Activity frequency of M&A 
Doukas and Petmezas (2007) used the frequency of mergers and acquisitions activity to 
measure managerial overconfidence. They defined managers who carried out more than five 
mergers and acquisitions within three years as overconfident managers. They believe higher 
numbers of mergers and acquisitions by managers, may be due to the overconfidence mentality 
of overestimating M&A earnings and underestimating M&A risks. 
 
2.2 Literature Review  
Since the 1980s, with the accumulation of various abnormal phenomena in financial markets 
and the development of psychology and other related disciplines, the traditional "rational man" 
hypothesis has become increasingly weak in explaining real economic life and behavior. 
Behavioral finance theory breaks through the limitations of traditional financial theory. Based 
on the psychological research results, starting from the actual decision-making psychology of 
investors, it re-examines the influence of the human factors that dominate the financial market. 
Based on the two theories of "limited arbitrage" and "irrationality" of the subject, focused on 
researching and explaining various abnormal phenomena in the financial market and made 





Thereafter, behavioral finance theory began to penetrate into the traditional corporate finance 
field, so that the research in this application field was gradually carried out (Shi, 2006). This 
school of thought holds that, like investors’ behavior in the financial market, corporate financial 
decision-making behavior may also be affected by the errors of business managers and 
investors' behavior. 
At present, behavioral corporate finance research is based on an assumption about  manager 
and investor rationality, respectively. The former assumes that managers are rational 
individuals, and studies the influence of irrational behavior or market sentiment of investors in 
capital market on corporate financial decision-making. The latter assumes that investors are 
rational, that the price of securities market reflects the value of enterprises truthfully, and that 
managers’ irrationality affects financial decision-making. Relatively speaking, because the 
irrational characteristics of managers are more difficult to observe and define, the second branch 
mentioned above is not as good as the first branch in terms of time or quantity of research 
results. This is an area that can be developed future in the literature (Barberis & Thaler, 2003; 
Shi, 2006). The following is a summary of the most closely related research. 
A large number of psychological experimental observations and empirical studies have shown 
that people tend to believe too much in their judgment, overestimate their probability of success, 
attribute success to their ability, and underestimate the role of luck, opportunity and external 
forces, namely the so-called "overconfidence". Overconfidence is a deep-rooted psychological 
phenomenon, which is related to people's lack of ability to deal with a large number of uncertain 
events. Overconfidence usually takes two forms: first, the lack of accuracy in estimating 
probability; second, people set confidence intervals for quantitative estimation that are too 
narrow (Jiang, 2005). 
Psychologists believe that overconfidence is a typical and universal cognitive bias, and its 
formation has certain regularity. For example, after a series of successes, people tend to increase 
their self-confidence: more pronounced when decision-making tasks are challenging; men are 




Roll (1986) made a pioneering contribution to the study of managerial overconfidence. He first 
introduced the irrationality of managers into the study of corporate finance, believing that 
managers’ “hubris" can not only explain the over-investment payment in the process of 
corporate mergers and acquisitions, but also apply to other forms of investment. Larwood & 
Whittaker (1977) and Alicke & Yurak (1995) show that people who think they are "rational" 
tend to overestimate themselves when assessing their abilities. This is because people want to 
be "better than average", that is, they think their ability is higher than the average level, resulting 
in overconfident behavior. Many professions have overconfidence behaviors, such as engineers, 
health care workers, lawyers, managers, entrepreneurs, etc., when compared with other 
professions. Managers of enterprises are more likely to show overconfidence, mainly for three 
reasons: (1) Control hallucination exists. Because managers’ opinions are very important when 
making company decisions, they can decide whether the company will invest or buy-out 
activities, and also make managers overestimate their control over investment projects, thus 
underestimate the possibility of project failure. (2) High commitment to good performance. 
Weinstein (1980) proposed in his research that the cost of human capital of managers is closely 
related to the value of enterprises. From the first level, managers’ remuneration is mostly 
composed of stock and stock options of their company and the company's performance plays a 
decisive role in the value of stock and option. At the same time, from another point of view, the 
company's performance can also determine whether the current managers can be appointed or 
fired directly by the company. Combining these two reasons, managers will solemnly promise 
the company that there will be good performance in the future. (3) The fuzziness of performance 
evaluation reference. Alicke and Yurak (1995) argues that managers usually develop their 
existing businesses in a relatively stable way, and are less likely to choose large-scale 
investment activities, including mergers and acquisitions. And because these decisions have 
their own characteristics, and other factors such as company performance will also have an 
impact on them, it is difficult to evaluate all the performance of managers during their tenure. 
Nisbett and Ross (1980) found in their research that managers’ errors in decision-making may 




make important decisions that they do not have such experience. In the evaluation of his 
performance, it is not too reasonable to evaluate, so managers cannot have a clear understanding 
of themselves, so long-term accumulation will lead to managers’ overconfidence. 
With the continuous development of behavioral finance, the theoretical and practical circles are 
increasingly aware of the main impact of managerial overconfidence on corporate finance 
research. Many insightful research have emerged in China and abroad, focusing on the impact 
of managerial overconfidence on corporate investment decisions. 
2.2.1 Overseas research environments 
Behavioral finance scholars believe that overconfidence is particularly common among 
business managers, mainly for the following reasons: First, individuals with advanced skills 
often show "above average" self-confidence due to the lack of reference groups (Kruger, 1999). 
Large-scale investments, mergers and acquisitions, capital restructuring and other matters that 
top managers are responsible for are relatively rare in the enterprise life cycle. Every major 
decision-making lacks sufficient past experience as a reference. This special decision-making 
environment forms a good soil for the growth in overconfidence. Second, the more abstract the 
task is, the worse the outcome will be and the more overconfident the performance will be 
(Moore & Kim, 2013). The decision-making content of major investment projects for which 
executives are responsible is complex and difficult to compare horizontally, and their 
overconfident behavior can hardly be perceived. Third, psychological experiments also found 
that human over-optimism was particularly evident in matters under control or of great concern 
to oneself (Larger, 1975; Weinstein, 1980). On the one hand, executives, especially CEOs, have 
the final say in large-scale investment projects and strategic decisions. This special position 
may convince him of his control over the outcome of his actions and underestimate the 
possibility of failure. On the other hand, with the application of stock and option incentives, the 
value of human capital of senior executives is increasingly closely related to the return of 
corporate returns. From the point of view of remuneration or from the perspective of career 
development, executives show great concern for the results of their business decisions. 




within the enterprise. In conclusion, psychological evidence shows that it is common for top 
decision makers to overestimate their skills and be overly optimistic about the outcome of 
decision-making. Reflected in investment decision-making, managers tend to overestimate 
project returns, underestimate project risks and costs, and rely too much on their own 
information and past experience. 
The inference that managers tend to be overconfident is supported by empirical research. 
Cooper et al. (1998) and Landier & Thesmar (2009) surveys on venture capital show that most 
entrepreneurs overestimate their chances of success in initial investment, and there is a 
considerable gap between the survival probability and profitability of subsequent venture 
capital and investors’ prediction. Malmendier & Tate (2005) argues that from the perspective 
of asset diversification and reducing personal risk exposure, managers should cash in their 
stocks or options at a favorable time. However, in the study of American listed companies from 
1990 to 2014, they found that a considerable number of managers gave up executing expired 
options or did not execute options when the stock price was high, thus confirming the existence 
of overconfidence. 
Most behavioral finance scholars believe that overconfident managers often believe that the 
market underestimates the company's basic value and that issuing new shares will bring losses 
to existing long-term investors. Therefore, as a representative of long-term investors, managers 
will take equity financing methods only as a last resort. When investors have less restriction on 
corporate capital structure, overconfident managers will show preferential financing 
preferences in financing decision-making. That is to say, it tends to use the company's 
endogenous capital first, followed by creditor's rights financing, and equity financing is only 
the last choice. In fact, from Donaldson (1961) to Fama &. French (2011), the theoretical 
literature on pecking order financing clearly reflects that pecking order financing preference is 
related to managers’ overconfidence. 
In addition to preferred financing, managers’ overconfidence may also lead to increased debt 
use. Shefrin (2001) proposed in his research review on behavioral finance that overconfidence 




structure. Heaton (2002) analyzed the impact of overconfidence on corporate financing 
decisions without considering asymmetric information and moral hazard. He points out that 
overconfident managers believe that the market underestimates the value of corporate equity 
securities, so even if the market is actually effective in securities pricing, there is still a problem 
of mispricing in the eyes of managers. As a result, managers will try to avoid using external 
financing; if necessary, they will follow the rules of issuing bonds first and then stocks. 
Research by Russo and Schoemaker(1992)，Larwood and Whittaker(1977), Cooper, Woo and 
Dunkelberg (1998) , Camerer & Lovallo (1999) found that most corporate managers often 
overestimate their investment capabilities, business capabilities and profitability of investment 
projects. 
Jensen & Meckling (1976), Jensen (1986), Gilson (1989) found that managers tend to 
overinvest in order to maximize their personal welfare or reputation. Research by March and 
Shapira (1987) found that managers who own investment projects believe they can control 
returns and underestimate the likelihood of failure. 
Gervais and Odean (2001) compared the investment decisions of overconfident or optimistic 
managers with rational managers. They found that managers tend to accept projects earlier 
because of overconfident or overoptimistic, while rational managers tend to delay accepting 
projects because of risk aversion. 
Heaton (2002) research has proved that even without information asymmetry and agency costs, 
managers’ overconfidence may lead to distorted investment. He believes that overconfident 
managers will overestimate the future returns of investment projects. When faced with the 
choice of internal financing or external financing, they will think that the cost of external 
financing is too high. Therefore, when companies have abundant net cash flow, they will show 
excessive enthusiasm for investment. When free cash flow is insufficient, managers tend to be 
under-invested because they are unwilling to choose external financing. The author believes 
that if managers are overconfident, they will overestimate the value they generate for the 
company, which will lead to an overestimation of the cash flow generated by the company's 




in turn results in managers being more reluctant in choosing external financing methods. But if 
companies really needs external financing, because bond prices are less sensitive to market 
expectations than stock prices, overconfident managers will realize that the cost of issuing 
bonds is lower than the cost of issuing stocks, so most of them will choose debt financing. 
Therefore, overconfident managers prefer the order of "internal financing, debt financing and 
equity financing" when choosing the investment order. 
Gervais, Heaton and Odean (2002) investigate the relationship between overconfident 
managers and corporate investment through a two-stage capital budget model with real options. 
The study finds that risk aversion can induce managers to delay investment, thereby reducing 
shareholder value. Overconfidence can offset risk aversion. Overconfident managers seldom 
hesitate before making investment decisions. This is because overconfident managers believe 
that the risk of project implementation is lower than the actual, and that the net present value of 
the project is larger than the actual, so overconfident managers are more decisive when 
investing. 
Polk, Christopher and Paola (2004) analysis found that companies that are overvalued tend to 
overinvest, while companies that are undervalued tend to underinvest. They further 
demonstrated that there was a significant correlation between corporate investment behavior 
and market inefficiency. 
Hackbarth (2004) studied the agency problem between the manager and the owner or 
shareholder of the enterprise, and put forward that if the manager is overconfident, there will 
be deviation in choosing the capital structure of the enterprise. This conclusion questioned the 
trade-off theory. He believes that managers who are overconfident in the profitability of 
potential investment projects will overestimate, at the same time could be underestimate the 
risk of investment projects, so it will lead to more financial difficulties. After assessing the costs 
and benefits associated with debt financing, managers tend to choose a capital structure with a 
higher debt ratio rather than the best one. 
Hackbarth (2004) believes that if managers are overconfident, on the one hand, they will 




so they will choose a capital structure with a higher debt ratio. On the other hand, when waiting 
for investment, the opportunity cost will increase with this time. When managers overestimate 
the growth of enterprises, overconfident managers will start investment projects faster than 
rational managers, in order to solve the problem of insufficient investment caused by debt 
financing. Therefore, he believes that if the overconfidence of managers is not too high, 
overconfidence can alleviate the problem of underinvestment, which will also help to alleviate 
the agency problem between creditors and shareholders, and ultimately improve the debt ratio 
of enterprises. 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) used the net growth of the number of stocks or stock options held 
by managers during the exercise period as an index to measure whether managers were 
overconfident or not. Empirical studies were carried out with the sensitivity of investment to 
cash flow as an index to measure investment distortion, which proved that CEO's 
overconfidence was the common cause of non-optimal investment decision-making. Compared 
with rational CEO, overconfident CEO's investment is more sensitive to cash flow, which leads 
to distorted investment behavior. From the aspect of corporate investment behavior, they found 
that overconfident managers often overestimate the future benefits of mergers and acquisitions. 
When there are sufficient funds within the company, they will choose to invest excessively. But 
if the company's internal capital turnover is not good, managers will reduce investment options 
because of the high external financing costs. From the latter point of view, managers are more 
likely to complete the company's excessive investment M&A projects if there is a strong 
liquidity of cash flow within the company. Assuming that both the company choosing equity 
financing and the company choosing debt financing are overconfident, the former will rely more 
on the cash flow inside the company when investing, and the latter will be more sensitive to the 
cash flow in the process of investing. In their subsequent empirical tests, they measured 
managerial overconfidence by accounting for the specific risk exposure of the manager’s 
portfolio in companies where they worked, respectively. These are listed as follows: (i) whether 
managers do or do not have stock options that are close to exercise; (ii) whether managers will 




increase their holding of their own company's stocks. These three conditions are used to identify 
the substitution of managers’ overconfidence. In their empirical test, the authors find that if the 
managers of the company are overconfident, the investment projects of the company will be 
more sensitive to cash flow, especially if the company chooses equity financing. Malmendier 
and Tate (2008) in their follow-up study, measured managers’ overconfidence by describing 
managers' personality characteristics, and re-tested the stability of the above-mentioned test 
results. This result still supports the original conclusion. 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) examined the relationship between managerial overconfidence 
and corporate investment decisions. Their research data show that managers who show 
overconfidence have less external financing from capital markets than managers who do not 
show overconfidence. If firms do need external financing, overconfident managers are less 
likely to choose equity financing. At the same time, they argue that the above findings can also 
be used to explain corporate "debt conservatism" behavior, because overconfident managers 
may prefer debt financing rather than equity financing, which will lead to a lower debt ratio. 
Aktas, De Bondt and Roll (2006) used the rational expectation model to study the effects of 
managerial overconfidence and learning in M&A decision-making. They predicted that for 
rational, risk-averse CEOs, the cumulative abnormal returns after M&A should continue to 
decline. This is because, from one transaction to another transaction, a rational CEO becomes 
more and more aggressive in the bidding process. These CEOs will transfer most of the 
expected profit to the target shareholders in order to win the merger. For overconfident CEOs, 
if they survive the market competition, the learning process will gradually make them no longer 
overconfident and overoptimistic. In their model, CEOs have to weigh two opposing forces: 
one is to try to improve the probability of successful transactions, and the other is the possibility 
of being fired because of overpayment. Based on the model, they report four conclusions: (1) 
the optimal acquisition premium is the expected return of cooperative returns and the reduction 
function of the correlation coefficient between current profits and expected synergistic returns; 
(2) overconfidence leads to the rise of the best premium and overpayment. However, when the 




underestimation of the synergistic risk system, leading to over-payment; (3) for rational CEOs, 
learning improves their predictive ability, which in turn reduces the change of expected 
synergistic returns, so learning will lead to the improvement of the best premium and the higher 
possibility of successful transaction, the transfer of expected synergistic returns to the target 
shareholders and the lower excess returns of mergers and acquisitions after M&A, and (4) for 
overconfident CEOs, the consequence of learning is the gradual correction of cognitive bias, 
the frequency of mergers and acquisitions decreases, and the value destruction decreases 
gradually from one transaction to another. 
Brown and Zorn (2006) have constructed a model that shows the influence of belief differences 
on M&A activities. This model combines the overconfidence between M&A companies and 
managers and the possible valuation errors in the stock market. In this model, there are several 
hypotheses that can be tested, including the mode of payment, the amount of premium paid to 
the market, and the market's response to M&A. Through model reasoning, they come up with 
several hypotheses about managerial overconfidence that can be tested: (1) Overconfident 
managers prefer cash payment in M&A; (2) In the process of M&A, the overconfident 
managers will have a large premium when they use cash payment. (3) Compared with rational 
managers, overconfident managers often have a lower return on bulletin days. 
Ben-David, Graham and Harvey (2006)，Barros and Silveira (2007) validate Hackbarth's point 
of view in 2004 through empirical research. Ben-David, Graham and Harvey (2006) selected 
the CFOs from the United States to predict the stock returns of the companies they belong to, 
and then used the confidence level of the probability distribution of the market returns of the 
company's stocks to represent the explanation of the excessive confidence level of CFOs, in 
order to achieve the study on the impact of the excessive confidence level of CFOs on the 
decision-making behavior of mergers and acquisitions. The empirical results show that self-
confident CFOs tend to choose higher debt ratios. 
In the study of the listed companies, Barros and Silveira (2007) explained whether the behavior 
of managers' overconfidence affected the merger and acquisition decisions, and put forward 




managers. The results show that if a company founder is a manager of an enterprise, it usually 
chooses a higher debt ratio than a hired professional manager. 
In their empirical test, Goel and Thakor (2008) found that if the degree of self-confidence is 
appropriate, it can actually alleviate the degree of risk aversion of managers, so as to increase 
the investment behavior of enterprises appropriately, and ultimately achieve the purpose of 
increasing the value of enterprises. However, if the manager's self-confidence is too high, their 
judgments will differ, and this will lead to the problem of over investment and may damage the 
value of the enterprise. In this case the manager overconfidence does not impact the value of 
the enterprises linearly. 
Brown and Sarma (2007) used the data of M&A transactions of Australian listed companies for 
1994-2003 years, and conducted an empirical analysis of the relationship between managerial 
overconfidence and corporate mergers and acquisitions. The results showed that CEO 
overconfidence and CEO dominance had a significant impact on mergers and acquisitions. 
Doukas and Petmezas (2007) studied the relationship between overconfidence and mergers and 
acquisitions in Britain from 1980 to 2004. The results show that the announcement earnings of 
overconfident managers are lower than that of rational managers, and in the long run, the 
performance of overconfident managers is worse. 
Hackbarth (2004) believes that in a sense, overconfident managers tend to be overly optimistic, 
which means that enterprises are bound to face more debt, reduce agency costs and increase 
corporate value. Correspondingly, excessive deviation will weaken the value of the enterprise 
itself. 
Glaser et al. (2008) expands the scope of research on managers, and classifies overconfident 
senior managers such as CEO, CFO, and directors as overconfident managers. The results 
further confirm that when managers become more confident and beyond the normal range, the 
sensitivity of investment and cash flow increases accordingly.  
Billet and Qian (2008) studied the sources of managerial overconfidence by examining the 
historical data of 3,702 M&A transactions conducted by 2,142 different M&A firms from 1985 




second or higher transaction of mergers and acquisitions has significant negative announcement 
returns; (2) Although the good performance of previous M&A may lead to more M&A, the 
good performance of previous M&A cannot compensate for the bad performance of later M&A, 
and (3) the net purchases of senior management stocks before high-level M&A transactions are 
larger than those before the first M&A transactions. They interpret these results as self-
attribution bias that leads to managers’ overconfidence. They also found that the market was 
able to anticipate future transactions based on the acquisition history of mergers and 
acquisitions, and to reflect that expectation in stock prices. 
Lin, Michayluk and Oppenheimer (2008) took the M&A events of Listed Companies in Japan 
from 1989 to 2003 as a sample, and uses the past stock return rate as an alternative variable of 
managerial overconfidence to study the problem of managerial overconfidence in M&A. They 
found that there is also a serious phenomenon of managerial overconfidence in Japanese M&A. 
Overconfident managers often have excess returns during negative events, while non-
overconfident managers have excess returns during positive events. 
Liu and Taffler (2008) examined M&A activities from a behavioral perspective using a sample 
of 1,900 M&A transactions and 3,100 CEO data from 1993 to 2005. Their findings show that 
over-confident CEOs are more likely to engage in M&A than rational CEOs. The 
overconfidence of M&A company CEO has a significant negative impact on short-term and 
long-term performance after M&A, especially for large companies; the overconfidence of CEO 
has a significant negative impact on the short-term performance of M&A companies. 
Cordeiro (2009) used the timely exercise of stock options by CEO and media evaluation of 
CEO as indicators to measure managers’ overconfidence, and carry out an empirical study on 
the relationship between CEO overconfidence and corporate dividend policy. The study finds 
that overconfident CEOs are unwilling to pay cash dividends; even if they pay cash dividends, 
the cash dividends paid by overconfident CEOs are lower than those paid by rational CEOs. 
In his real option model, Hackbarth (2009) studied whether managers’ overconfidence affected 
the interaction in the process of investment and financing decision-making. This is because 




Compared with rational managers, underinvestment will worsen. Secondly, overconfident 
managers spend less time choosing whether or not to make investment decisions, which is also 
a reflection of improving efficiency, and from this point of view can also increase the value of 
enterprises. 
Fairchild (2009) proposed that managers with overconfident style may increase the value of 
enterprises, but in some cases, the value of enterprises may also decrease. This impact is 
interfered by the level of effort or the risk of financial distress. He believes that managers’ 
overconfidence also has a certain optimum level, and can often create the best corporate value. 
Landier and Thesmar (2009) studied the relationship between entrepreneur overconfidence and 
debt maturity structure. They believe that overconfident entrepreneurs will choose short-term 
debt, while realistic entrepreneurs will choose long-term debt. This is because overconfident 
entrepreneurs often overestimate the safety of their investment projects and underestimate the 
possibility of default on debt contracts. At the same time, short-term debt contract is binding 
on enterprise. When overconfident entrepreneurs make invalid investment decisions, short-term 
debt contract can timely adjust entrepreneurs’ control over the enterprise; rational entrepreneurs 
consider the risk of using short-term debt is too high, so they choose to use long-term debt. On 
the basis of theoretical research, Landier and Thesmar also carry out an empirical study. They 
took the deviation between the expectation of entrepreneurs’ growth in advance and the actual 
growth of enterprises after the event as the substitute variable of entrepreneurs' overconfidence. 
They made an empirical analysis on the sample of 39,000 newly established enterprises in 
France, and found that the overconfident entrepreneurs used more short-term debt. This 
suggests that rational entrepreneurs prefer long-term debt funds with lower risk. 
Slothouber (2010) takes North American listed companies as an example to study the period 
from 2006 to 2009. He took managerial shareholding as an alternative variable to replace 
managerial overconfidence; using Tobin Q to measure corporate value; debt financing, 
choosing the total asset-liability ratio as a substitute, and discussing the overconfidence that 




will inevitably make enterprises bear more liabilities, push enterprises into more distressed 
financial situation, and cause serious distress to the value of enterprises. 
Hirshleifer et al. (2012) believes that CEO overconfidence can always find more growth 
opportunities in the market to promote the rapid development of enterprises, which will 
undoubtedly improve the value of enterprises. 
When Hirshleifer et al. (2012) studied the influence of overconfidence on venture project 
investment; he uses options-based and news-based methods to measure overconfidence. The 
study finds that overconfident CEOs invest more in R&D, have more patents and are more 
likely to succeed in innovation. 
Ben-David et al. (2006) found that companies with overconfident CEOs tend to pay less 
dividends and participate in the market more opportunistically. 
Further results researched by Schrand and Zechman (2012) shows that the overconfidence leads 
to more serious financial misstatements. 
Mohamed et a1.(2014) believes that the effect of managerial overconfidence on the efficiency 
of enterprise investment is not universal in every enterprise, and the sensitivity between 
enterprise investment and cash flow only exists in enterprises with large financing constraints. 
Generally speaking, foreign scholars have reached the same conclusion about the influence of 
managerial overconfidence on corporate investment decision-making. That is, the investment 
behavior of overconfident managers is very sensitive to cash flow. When cash flow is abundant, 
the investment is excessive, and when cash flow is insufficient, the investment is low. 
 2.2.2 Domestic research situations 
In order to verify the applicability of the theory of managerial overconfidence in China, 
domestic scholars have conducted a lot of research and exploration in this field in recent years, 
and reached some important conclusions. 
(1) Theoretical research 
Zou, Xia and Yu (2006) introduced the theoretical models proposed by Baker, Ruback and 





Yan et al. (2006) show that on the basis of analyzing the limitations of Western scholars’ 
extended research on Multi-task Principal-agent model, from the perspective of behavioral 
economics, assuming that the agent is no longer a completely rational economic person, but an 
"irrational person" who encounters overconfident psychological prejudice, introducing 
overconfident psychological prejudice into the basic analysis framework of multi-task 
principal-agent model, and then using it. The standard principal-agent analysis technology deals 
with the model after changing the key assumptions, and modifies the analysis framework and 
some basic conclusions of the multi-task principal-agent model. 
Wang and Zhou (2007) used the assumption of overconfidence to construct a simple behavioral 
corporate finance model, and used this model to sort out the related research, and reviewed the 
theoretical and empirical literature explaining the investment distortions from the perspective 
of irrational managers. 
Ye and Yuan (2008) combined the research on investment decision making in behavioral 
corporate finance ， summarizes the research results on the influence of managers’ 
overconfidence, herd mentality and investor sentiment on investment decision-making, and 
systematically expounds the main contributions, key issues and policy implications of existing 
research. It is considered that the theory of enterprise investment based on overconfidence 
hypothesis is of great significance to the governance of investment distortion. 
Chen and Yang (2007) studied the principal-agent relationship under the condition of agent 
overconfidence and the mechanism of overconfidence on principal-agent relationship. The 
results show that when the benefit wage of the agent and the supervision cost of the principal 
are not equal to zero, the optimal effort level of the agent will increase with the increase of the 
degree of overconfidence, and the optimal supervision intensity of the principal will decrease 
with increases in the degree of agent overconfidence of the agent. When the agent has no 
effective salary, the agent's overconfidence does not play a role in the principal-agent 
relationship. In addition, the best effort level of the agent and the best supervision degree of the 
client will decrease with the increase of the supervision cost of the principal, and the former 




agent, while the latter will also increase with the increase of the fixed remuneration of the agent, 
but not always with the increase of the benefit wage of the agent. 
Under the unique system of China, Zhang and Zhang (2011) have analyzed in-depth the various 
motives that may exist in the management of a listed company when the performance notice is 
issued by the company. Considering the reality of the Chinese market, it is considered that the 
announcement of management performance in China's listed companies is based on three 
motives: management stock reward, management ability, and capital market transaction. 
Xu (2013) agree that overconfident managers have more serious overinvestment than rational 
managers. 
Sun and Zhao (2014) found that management overconfidence significantly reduced the 
company's accounting conservatism. Due to the absence of owner and soft debt constraint in 
state-owned listed companies, the effect of management overconfidence on accounting 
conservatism is more significant in private enterprises. 
Li et al. (2015) argued that the cash flow of enterprises is often very limited in the downturn of 
capital market. At this time, overconfident managers are unwilling to adopt higher cost external 
financing methods and give up investment projects with better future returns, which lead to 
underinvestment of enterprises. This shows that managers’ overconfidence may also lead to 
underinvestment, which deserves our attention. 
Lu et al. (2017) found that overconfident CEOs help to improve R&D efficiency when certain 
conditions are met. 
Wu and Zheng (2017) conducted a study from the perspective of enterprise ownership. The 
results show that overconfidence of private enterprise managers has a greater impact on 
overinvestment than that of state-owned enterprises. 
(2) Empirical research 
Hao, Liu and Lin (2005) based on the shareholding status and changing characteristics of top 
executives of Listed Companies in China, makes a theoretical analysis on the driving factors, 
behavioral characteristics and actual performance of top Executives’ overconfidence, and 




growth level of corporate investment, and cash flow sensitivity of top Executives’ investment 
under different financing constraints. The results show that, compared with the moderate self-
confidence behavior of senior managers, the overconfidence behavior of senior managers not 
only has a significant positive correlation with the level of investment growth, but also has 
higher cash flow sensitivity. Under the unique equity arrangement and governance structure of 
listed companies in China, overconfident executives are more likely to lead to over-investment 
behavior with low allocation efficiency in corporate investment decision-making. They regard 
the change of CEO's shareholding as an alternative variable to managerial overconfidence. The 
results show that the investment level of overconfident senior managers is significantly higher 
than that of non-overconfident senior managers, and they are more sensitive to cash flow when 
investing. 
Lin, Hu and Chen (2005) take the listed companies as samples, and find that in the companies 
with financing constraints, optimistic managers show higher investment cash flow sensitivity. 
Wang (2006) measured the degree of managers’ self-confidence based on their exposure to 
corporate risks and financial information, and discussed the impact of managers' self-
confidence on corporate investment. The research shows that managers’ moderate self-
confidence can play a "moderate" role in promoting corporate investment and partly eliminate 
the "insufficient investment" problem in corporate governance. However, managers’ 
overconfident corporate investment level has a high sensitivity to net free cash flow per share 
and market-to-net ratio, forming "overinvestment". Managers’ self-confidence has a U-shaped 
curve effect on investment activities. That is to say, in the case of the tightest and looser 
financial constraints, the force is greater, while in the intermediate state it is smaller. 
Wang, Zhang and Yu (2008) have demonstrated that overconfident managers tend to overinvest, 
and managers' overconfidence is positively correlated with overinvestment level. At the same 
time, it is more sensitive to cash flow generated by financing activities, rather than free cash 
flow generated by production and operation activities. 
Jiang et al. (2009) discussed the relationship between managerial overconfidence and enterprise 




overconfidence has a significant impact on the expansion of Chinese enterprises. There is a 
significant positive correlation between managerial overconfidence and the total investment 
level and internal expansion of enterprises. When enterprises have abundant cash flow, the 
positive correlation is greater. 
Jiang (2010) chose the deviation between CEO's predicted earnings and actual earnings and the 
general manager's personal characteristics to describe managers’ overconfidence. The results 
show that: compared with the moderate self-confidence behavior of senior managers, the 
overconfidence behavior of senior managers not only has a significant positive correlation with 
the level of investment growth, but also has higher cash flow sensitivity. 
Huang and Fu (2010) used behavioral finance method to investigate the financing strategies of 
A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2002 to 2007. The 
study finds that corporate debt financing with management overconfidence is highly sensitive 
to financing gap. 
Yan and Kong (2010) studied the relationship between corporate debt and overinvestment 
caused by managers’ overconfidence. Overconfident managers prefer to raise funds through 
short-term liabilities and use the free cash borrowed in this way to invest in projects with a net 
present value of less than zero. This is also a manifestation of the inefficient investment of an 
enterprise, so that the value of the enterprise suffers unnecessary losses. 
Wei (2011) pointed out that the management overconfidence of listed companies is influenced 
by many factors, such as salary incentive, board governance structure, financial situation, 
capital structure, and company size. Among them, asset-liability ratio is negatively correlated 
with management overconfidence, while other factors are positively correlated with 
management overconfidence. The main influencing factor is financial situation. 
Yang et al. (2011) believes that managers' overconfidence stems from their pursuit of work and 
the realization of intrinsic value. This is not opportunism. When they run a company, they aim 
at maximizing the company's performance to realize their personal value. In the empirical 
analysis, it is further proved that managers' overconfidence can effectively improve the business 




Gao et al. (2013) empirically analyzed the relationship between the behavior of controlling 
shareholders and the performance forecast of management. The results showed that the strategy 
of performance forecast issuance by management was mainly influenced by the interests’ 
defense motivation and interest-driven motivation of management. 
Wang (2013) empirically analyzed the impact of investor sentiment on corporate information 
disclosure strategy, mainly from the management level of voluntary disclosure of performance 
forecasts, accuracy of performance forecasts and performance forecast attitude to measure 
management performance prediction strategy. It is found that besides micro-enterprise level 
factors; investor sentiment at macro-market level also affects the performance forecasting 
strategies of listed company management. 
Xu (2013) found that overconfident managers are more likely to initiate investment behavior 
and cause over investment than rational managers. The research divided the selected samples 
into two groups of data of non-family listed companies and family listed companies. Empirical 
tests show that the investment decision-making behavior of enterprises will be affected by 
overconfident management. The results show that family listed companies are more likely to 
show overconfident tendencies, so it is easier to lead to overinvestment. 
Li et al. (2015) took 2011 as an example, and made a systematic study of 765 listed companies 
in China. The age of leaders, the proportion of senior managers’ shares, and the proportion of 
men were taken as the measure of overconfidence. The single-share income was used to 
measure the performance of enterprises, and the relationship between leaders' overconfidence 
and performance was discussed in depth. The conclusion shows that: leaders’ overconfidence, 
in many cases, will not be conducive to corporate performance; in the impact of leadership 
overconfidence on performance, debt financing preference also plays an important intermediary 
role. 
Wang et al. (2014) took 314 non-financial listed companies that have successive mergers and 
acquisitions during 2005-2012 years as samples to study whether managerial overconfidence 
affects the continuity of M&A behavior. They found that managerial overconfidence is 




adjust the relationship between managers’ overconfidence and learning behavior, that is, the 
higher the proportion of independent directors, the less inaction caused by managers' 
overconfidence. 
Zhang (2017) selected 137 overseas M&A cases of 111 companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchanges from 2008 to 2014 as samples for research. The author regards the change of 
managerial shareholding as an alternative variable of overconfident management psychology, 
and chooses the change of operating profit margin and total asset return of enterprises one year 
after and one year before transactional mergers and acquisitions as the alternative variables of 
transactional mergers and acquisitions performance, so as to establish a regression model. The 
results show that managers’ overconfidence has a significant negative impact on the 
performance of cross-border M&A of Listed Companies in China, and free cash flow has a 
significant negative impact on the performance of cross-border M&A of Listed Companies in 
China. The more abundant the free cash flow, the stronger the negative relationship between 
the overconfidence of companies and managers and the performance of cross-border M&A of 
Listed Companies in China. 
Ji and Wang (2017) found that management will make the reported earnings within the earnings 
forecast range, otherwise, management will carry out earnings management, so that the actual 
report value is as close as possible within the forecast range, which shows that management 
will make the reported earnings meet its published earnings forecast. 
Although the conclusions of domestic scholars are basically consistent with those of foreign 
scholars, however, the substitution variables of managerial overconfidence are different. 
Whether this will affect the robustness of the conclusions is a topic for future research. 
 
2.3 Summary  
The literature review identifies how the introduction of managerial overconfidence into 
corporate finance research brings the research hypothesis closer to reality, as well as providing 




significantly associated with corporate investment decisions. These studies expand the field of 
corporate finance research, enriching corporate finance research methodology. However, 
theoretical and empirical studies on the relationship between managerial overconfidence and 
corporate financial decision-making behavior in China and abroad are still at the initial stage. 
Although some achievements have been made, there are still some shortcomings, which are 
manifested in: 
(1) There is no uniform standard to measure managers’ overconfidence. At present, the main 
measurement indicators used are: CEO shareholding status, mainstream media evaluation of 
CEO, corporate earnings forecast bias, CEO's relative salary, corporate prosperity index, and 
so on. Although it is reasonable to use these indicators to measure managers’ overconfidence, 
they also have their own limitations. For example, under the condition of imperfect capital 
market and imperfect incentive mechanism, CEO's stock ownership may not be suitable to 
measure managers’ overconfidence in Chinese companies. The entrepreneur confidence index 
is easy to obtain, but the data published by the National Bureau of Statistics is the enterprise 
prosperity index and entrepreneur confidence index of each industry, which mainly reflects the 
qualitative judgment and future expectation of entrepreneurs on the current economic situation 
of the industry. At the same time, this data is issued by industry, which is difficult to show the 
individual differences of managers' understanding of their own management ability. Therefore, 
by comparing and evaluating the advantages and disadvantages and rationality of the indicators 
used to measure managers’ overconfidence, we hope to find an indicator that suits the actual 
situation of China and can fully reflect managers' overconfidence. Future research may wish to 
consider this further. 
(2) Many conclusions are inconsistent. In the study on the influence of managerial 
overconfidence on corporate investment decision-making, some conclusions are consistent, 
such as excessive investment behavior when cash flow is sufficient, radical debt strategy, and 
so on. However, there are still disputes in the research of capital structure and dividend 




applicability of the theory on the basis of theoretical analysis. Especially in the special 










Chapter 3: Analysis of corporate governance and 
investment behavior of listed companies in China 
 
3.1 The concept Overconfidence of China Listed Companies’ managers 
Business managers are a relatively vague concept, which can only refer to top managers or all 
business managers including general managers. 
Foreign literatures usually limit managers to "key" persons such as CEO, CFO and chairman of 
listed companies. This is closely related to individualism in foreign cultural traditions. Only a 
few papers have studied senior managers as a whole. For example, Glaser, Schaafers and Weber 
(2008) studied the overconfidence of all senior managers in German enterprises, and found that 
enterprises with overconfident managers invest more and have higher investment-cash flow 
sensitivity. Consistent with the theoretical analysis, this result is more obvious for enterprises 




has a strong explanatory power when compared with pure CEO (CFO) optimism, and the more 
confident managers are, the lower the company's excess value. 
The purpose of this paper is to study the investment decision-making of enterprises. Therefore, 
the "manager" in this study mainly refers to the senior managers who have the decision-making 
power of enterprises, especially the investment decision-making power. According to the new 
Companies Act of China, senior managers, board of directors and shareholders’ meetings of 
listed companies have different levels of decision-making power on company affairs. Among 
them, senior managers such as company managers are responsible for organizing and 
implementing the annual business plan and investment plan, the board of directors is 
responsible for deciding the business plan and investment plan, and the shareholders’ meeting 
is responsible for deciding the company's business policy and investment plan. It can be seen 
that the companies act gives the shareholders’ meeting a kind of "macro decision-making 
power", but the daily investment decision-making power mainly lies in the hands of the board 
of directors and senior managers of the company. Wong (2006) also confirmed that in the power 
allocation of Listed Companies in China, the board of directors has the greatest decision-making 
power (the impact factor is 3.62), followed by senior managers (the impact factor is 3.03), and 
finally the shareholders’ meeting (the impact factor is 2.67), and the supervisors are not directly 
responsible for the company's major decisions. Therefore, according to the actual power 
allocation of Chinese Listed Companies' investment decisions, combined with the previous 
definition of executives and taking into account the availability of data, the managers covered 
by this study include: board members, general managers, and presidents of Listed Companies 
in China. The overestimation of the group's future earnings and success probability and the 
cognitive and behavioral bias towards the low risk and adverse events are called the 





3.2 Reasons for Overconfidence of Managers of Listed Companies in 
China 
A large number of studies have shown that business managers are more likely to show 
overconfident behavior bias. The reasons include the following aspects: 
(1) The complexity of enterprise management results in the overconfidence of managers. 
Business management is a very complex process that needs to make judgments and predict 
future situations while taking into consideration many uncertain factors. Research shows that 
overconfidence is a typical manifestation of people in the face of complex and difficult tasks. 
Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1977), Griffin and Tversky (1992) research show that people show 
a certain degree of lack of self-confidence when facing easier tasks; a considerable degree of 
overconfidence when facing more difficult tasks; and a very significant overconfidence when 
facing extremely difficult tasks. 
(2) Overconfidence is the need for managers to maximize their own effects. 
Business managers are always under pressure from shareholders, board of directors, the market, 
and the outside world. The internal selection mechanism of enterprises and the fierce market 
competition make continuous improvement of performance a necessary condition for the 
survival and development of enterprise management. Only managers with good performance 
have the opportunity to be retained or to be promoted, while moderate over-optimism can 
promote managers’ performance. At the same time, one of the results of managers’ self-
attribution is to increase their welfare and personal utility. Therefore, as a behavioral bias, 
overconfidence distorts managers’ information processing and decision-making to a certain 
extent, but this distortion can maximize its own effects. Therefore, in a sense, overconfidence 
is the need and result for managers to maximize their own effects. Although the incomplete 
rationality causes managers to distort information inappropriately, it is the best choice for 
managers to maximize their utility. 




Market competition makes improving the performance of enterprise management become the 
decisive factor for the survival and development of managers. In the fierce market competition 
mechanism, overconfident managers will have a higher chance of winning than others. In fact, 
the group of business managers is more overconfident than the general population because those 
with high self-confidence tend to apply for business management positions in the choice of 
positions. From the perspective of internal selection mechanism, obvious self-confidence and 
optimism are often seen as signals of high ability, so those who are overconfident about their 
future are more likely to be promoted to be managers of enterprises. Goel and Thakor (2008) 
argued that, consistent with the signaling theory in information economics, overconfident 
performance is often seen as a signal of higher competence and level by the selector, and 
overconfident managers are more likely to be promoted to CEO. There is a correlation between 
enterprise success and managers’ overconfidence. Due to the role of self-attribution bias, 
managers' success will further enhance their overconfidence  (Gervais, et al. 2002). 
Geol and Thakor (2008) proposed the second-stage leader selection model, which considers 
that overconfidence is the inevitable result of the highest decision-maker of an enterprise. 
Because of the company's evaluation and selection of managers is based on their past 
performance, which ultimately depends on the risk of managers. The corresponding result is 
that the greater the risk the managers take, the greater the chance they will get promotion. 
Overconfident managers are always inclined to overestimate the accuracy of information they 
have, overestimate their abilities, and underestimate the risk level of enterprise projects. This 
leads to that overconfident managers bearing more project risks and have higher performance 
than rational managers. Therefore, in a competitive market, overconfident managers will be 
successful. 
(4) Managers' overconfidence is the result of corporate governance environment 
Paredes (2004) proposed that CEO overconfidence is the inevitable result of corporate 
governance. In his opinion, the compensation system and the indulgence of the board of 
directors of enterprises have contributed to the overconfidence of managers. The corporate 




the following two aspects: first, a high salary to CEO overconfidence, a positive feedback, and 
giving them a signal that they are very successful. Research shows that positive feedback and 
recent success will lead to managers’ overconfidence. Second, the board's obedience to CEOs 
strengthens their overconfidence. Compared with corruption, dishonesty and fraud, the board 
of directors’ judgments on managers' business decisions show obvious compliance and 
tolerance. CEO become more bold and opinionated, and has very high corporate control power, 
which has led to their overconfidence. Of course, there are different opinions in academia. For 
example, Gao and Sudarsanam (2005) think that corporate governance structure has no 
substantial impact on risk preference of managers in mergers and acquisitions. Good past 
performance, good performance of stock market, and flattering evaluation of the media have 
strengthened the arrogance of management, making managers more risk seeking in mergers and 
acquisitions. 
 
3.3 The influence of Managerial Overconfidence on investment 
behavior of Chinese listed companies 
Enterprise investment is the direct source of enterprise value. It refers to enterprises’ activities 
in the field of production and operation in order to obtain expected future income, investment 
funds, and various resources. Scholars in China and abroad have done a lot of research on 
enterprise investment behavior from different perspectives. According to classical enterprise 
theory, maximizing enterprise value is the investment goal of an enterprise, and whether new 
investment can effectively improve enterprise value is the basis for enterprise investment. From 
the perspective of financing constraints of asymmetric information between the supply and 
demand sides of capital, The Pecking Order Theory holds that enterprises will choose 
endogenous financing with the lowest cost first, creditor's rights financing with lower cost 
second, and equity financing with the highest cost finally. Internal cash flow is an important 
factor in the level of enterprise investment. From the perspective of information asymmetry 




between managers and enterprise shareholders, shareholders and creditors. Managers have 
motivations of management defense and building its own empire out of self-interest, which 
leads to over-investment decision-making problems, and shareholders’ motivation of risk 
transfer also causes distortion of enterprise investment. 
Lin, Hu and Chen (2005) used earnings forecast bias as an alternative variable for managers’ 
overconfidence. When the annual earnings forecast made by managers exceeded the actual 
earnings level of the company, managers were regarded as overconfident. The data test of 
Chinese listed companies also confirms that managerial overconfidence has the same 
relationship with corporate investment decisions, that is, overconfident managers tend to invest 
too much in inefficient investment. 
Hao et al. (2005) used the number of managerial shareholdings to measure managerial 
overconfidence, and studied the relationship between managerial overconfidence and corporate 
investment by using the data of Listed Companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen in the past 2000-
2003 years. They believe that there are irrational behaviors of overconfidence among executives 
of Listed Companies in China. About a quarter of the executives of listed companies with equity 
incentives show overconfidence. Owing to the particularity of equity system arrangement and 
governance structure, the overconfidence of executives in Listed Companies in China is more 
likely to lead to inefficient over-investment behavior. To some extent, this tests the applicability 
of Malmendier's and Tate's (2005) conclusions in China. 
In the case of China's A share listed companies in 2006, Ye and Yuan (2008) studied the 
relationship between managers' confidence, corporate investment, and firm value by changing 
the voluntary shareholding of listed companies as a surrogate variable of overconfidence. 
Therefore, the psychological characteristics of managers’ self-confidence interact with 
enterprise investment and enterprise value. After controlling the other factors that affect the 
value of the company, we find that there is an obvious feedback relationship between 
managerial confidence and the value of A-share listed companies. The improvement of 
enterprise value promotes the improvement of management's self-confidence. At a moderate 




a certain limit, it has a negative impact on enterprise's value. The sensitivity of enterprise 
investment-cash flow also increases with the improvement of enterprise managers’ self-
confidence, and the increase of enterprise investment expenditure further increases managers' 
self-confidence. The increase of enterprise value also promotes the increase of investment 
expenditure, but investment expenditure does not significantly increase enterprise value. 
Jiang et al. (2009) used listed companies from year 2002 to 2005 as analysis samples, and chose 
earnings forecast bias and manager relative compensation as surrogate variables for 
overconfidence. The relationship between managerial overconfidence and enterprise expansion 
and their impact on financial distress were analyzed empirically. It was found that the higher 
the degree of managerial overconfidence, the more significant the expansion of enterprises. In 
the case of differentiating internal and external expansion, it is found that there is a significant 
positive correlation between managerial overconfidence and internal expansion, while the 
relationship between external expansions (M&A) is not significant. 
It is not difficult to find out that the existing research has done some studies on the relationship 
between managerial overconfidence and corporate investment in China's listed companies. 
However, due to the difficulty in measuring the indicators of overconfidence, the related 
research is still very limited. The validity and persuasiveness of the conclusions need to be 
further explored, which is also the motivation for this paper to put forward relevant hypotheses 




Chapter 4: Research Hypothesis and Methods 
 
4.1 Research Hypothesis 
Heaton (2002) believes that overconfident managers may overestimate the future net cash 
inflows of investment projects because of overconfidence, while ignoring the real investment 
value of investment projects, which leads to overinvestment. This paper proposes three 
hypotheses. 
(1) The research hypothesis H1: The degree of managerial overconfidence of Chinese listed 
companies has a positive impact on the scale of investment. 
The hypothesis is tested by Equation (1): 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
              𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡      (1)  
 
Investment is an explanatory variable, representing the scale of investment expenditure. Based 
on the research of Rao and Wang (2006), this paper adopts the ratio of the added value of long-
term assets to the total assets at the beginning of the period. 
Confidence is an alternative variable to managerial overconfidence. Drawing on the research 
ideas of Doukas and Petmezas (2007), this paper chooses the M&A events in A-share market 
of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2013 as 
samples, and divides two or more M&As in one year into overconfident managers. Corporate 
managers who make less than two acquisitions are classified as moderately self-confident 
managers. 
FCFF (Free Cash Flow for Firm) is used to measure the company's cash flow in this study and 
is divided by total assets to make all firms measures comparable. A large number of studies 
have confirmed the dependence of corporate investment on internal free cash flow. Although 




free cash flow is recognized, and the company's financing will give priority to internal cash 
flow, Li,Yan and Ning (2015). 
In order to study the influence of managerial overconfidence on corporate investment scale, 
besides overconfidence, this study also intends to select several important factors affecting 
corporate investment scale as control variables. 
Growth represents the company's growth opportunities. This paper uses Tobin Q value to 
measure the growth opportunities. Classical economics regards Tobin Q as a measure of 
investment opportunities, and holds that it should be positively related to the company's 
investment rate. 
Leverage represents the company's asset-liability ratio. Hart and Moore (1995) believe that high 
debt can restrain managers’ investment behavior, and that debt leverage is negatively correlated 
with future investment growth. 
Size represents the size of the company. This study intends to use the natural logarithm of total 
assets to measure. 
State represents the proportion of state-owned shares in a company, expressed as the percentage 
of state-owned shares in the total number of shares in an enterprise. If the proportion of state-
owned shares in the company is too high, the agency cost is too high in the case of imperfect 
system, which leads to more arbitrary investment by managers. 
(2) The research hypothesis H2: The degree of managerial overconfidence in Chinese listed 
companies has a positive impact on the level of corporate overinvestment. 
The hypothesis is tested by the following Equation (2): 
 
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 +
                   𝛽4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡      (2) 
  
In addition to the interpreted variable Overinvestment, the definitions of other variables in 
equation 2 are consistent with those in equation 1. Overinvestment, the explanatory variable, 




the investment expectation model. Richardson (2006) used the investment expectation model 
to estimate the normal investment level of the company, and then used the regression residual 
of the model as a measure variable of overinvestment and underinvestment. This paper uses 
Cai's (2009) model to measure the degree of overinvestment. 
(3) The research hypothesis H3: The investment behavior of overconfident managers in Chinese 
listed companies is highly sensitive to the cash flow generated by investment activities. 
The hypothesis is tested by the following Equations (3) and (4): 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
              𝛽6𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                   (3) 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑁𝐶𝐹𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
              𝛽6𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡  ∗ 𝑁𝐶𝐹𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                    (4) 
 
In the above equations, this study intends to use FCFF (Free Cash Flow for Firm) and NCFI 
(Net Cash Flow from Investment) to measure the company's cash flow. 
Among them, Confidence * FCFF and Confidence * NCFI are the interaction terms between 
managers’ overconfidence and corporate cash flow, which are used to test the sensitivity of 
overconfident managers' investment behavior to cash flow. Other control variables are similar 









Table 4-1 Description of Variables 
Variable Name Variable Definition Variable Description 
Investment Investment Expenditure Scale of Company 
Value added of long-term assets/total assets at the 
beginning of the period 
Overinvestment Overinvestment Level of Companies Residual term from investment expectation model 
Confidence 
Alternative variables of Managerial 
Overconfidence 
Two or more M&As in one year are classified as 
overconfident managers/Corporate managers who 
make less than two acquisitions are divided into 
moderately self-confident managers 
FCFF Company's free cash flow 
(Net Profit after Tax + Interest Cost + Non-Cash 
Expenditure) - Operating Capital Addition - 
Capital Expenditure 
NCFI 
Net Cash Flow from Corporate Investment 
Activities 
Cash and cash equivalents inflow (income) - 
outflow (expenditure) 
Growth Growth Opportunities of Companies Use Tobin Q value to measure 
Leverage Asset liability ratio of the company Total Liabilities/Total Assets *100% 
Size Company size Use the natural logarithm of total assets to measure 
State 
The proportion of state-owned shares in 
the company 
Expressed as the percentage of state-owned shares 
in the total shares of the enterprise 
D Annual dummy variable for the year When 2013, D is 1, otherwise it's zero. 
4.2 Selection of Agent Variables of "Manager Overconfidence" 
Doukas and Petmezas (2007) proposed the use of five or more M&As in three years as a 
criterion for classifying overconfident managers. However, whether this standard conforms to 
the actual situation of Chinese listed companies still needs further study. 
Since Shenzhen Baoan Group Co., Ltd. launched the first merger and acquisition of Chinese 
listed companies on September 30, 1993, merger and acquisition reorganization has become 
increasingly frequent in Chinese listed companies. Since 2005, China's economy has entered a 
stage of rapid development. The government has increased the adjustment of industrial structure, 
promoted mergers and acquisitions, promoted the redistribution of capital market and enhanced 
the competitiveness of enterprises. At the same time, the process of urbanization is accelerating. 




acquisitions reached a peak in 2007. Although affected by the economic crisis, the total amount 
of annual M&A in China fell in 2008, but with the introduction of the document "opinions of 
the State Council on promoting enterprise merger and reorganization" in 2010, the government 
relaxed the access restrictions on private capital, greatly reduced the obstacles of enterprise 
merger and reorganization, and then the M&A market rebounded in 2010 and 2011. However, 
in 2012, under the impact of the global economic weakness, China's economy encountered 
tremendous challenges, and the corresponding M&A market showed a downward trend. 
However, with the government's "Opinions on Encouraging and Guiding Private Enterprises to 
Actively Develop Overseas Investment" and "Guidance on Accelerating Mergers and 
Acquisitions of Enterprises in Key Industries" promulgated in 2012 and 2013, the M&A market 
has recovered. 
This study uses information sourced from Wind and the Guotai Junan database to select the 
data for Chinese listed companies from 2012 to 2013. It can be found from Tables A-1 to A-4, 
in the first quarter of 2012, China's M&A market continued its explosive growth in scale in 
2011, with a total transaction volume of 16.718 billion US dollars and 211 M&A cases. In the 
second quarter, the slowdown of China's economic growth directly affected the M&A market, 
and its activity and scale declined to a certain extent year on year. Total M&A in the third 
quarter was only $6,562 million. It was not until the end of the third quarter that indicators from 
macroeconomic data and restoration in market confidence that mergers and acquisitions began 
to pick up in the fourth quarter. In 2012, 991 mergers and acquisitions were completed in 
China's M&A market, of which 883 mergers and acquisitions involving a total of 50.762 billion 
US dollars were disclosed. Among them, domestic M&A activity is high, but the overall scale 
is small and the average amount of single M&A is low. Among them, there are 837 domestic 
M&A cases, accounting for 84.5% of the total number of cases, involving 17.279 billion US 
dollars. Overseas M&A has increased steadily, with high activity and large scale. There are 112 
overseas M&A cases, accounting for 11.3% of the number of cases, and the total amount of 
M&A is 29.825 billion US dollars. Foreign mergers and acquisitions only completed 42 cases 




3.658 billion US dollars. China's economy experienced a transitional period in 2013. Under the 
dual stimulation of domestic IPO suspension and M&A incentive policies, China's M&A 
market performed strongly. The number and amount of cases involved set a new record. In 
2013, China's M&A market completed 1,015 transactions, up 23.8% year-on-year; there were 
932 disclosed M&A cases, involving a total amount of US $72.623 billion, up 65.8% compared 
with the same period in 2012. Among them, 904 domestic mergers and acquisitions increased 
by 32.7% year on year, involving a total transaction value of 28.558 billion US dollars; 80 
overseas mergers and acquisitions decreased by 22.3% year on year, respresenting a transaction 
value of 32.179 billion US dollars; 31 foreign mergers and acquisitions involving transaction 
value of 11,885 billion US dollars. 
The data used in this analysis show that in 2012, the number of overseas M&A cases and the 
total amount of M&A of Chinese listed companies reached a new high.The average merger and 
acquisition amount is as high as 339 million US dollars. Domestic mergers and acquisitions 
have not only declined in activity, but also declined more rapidly. The average value of 
domestic mergers and acquisitions of $24.4111 million is less than one tenth of overseas 
mergers and acquisitions. This not only results in changes in the distribution of M&A types, 
but it also shows that China’s international M&A market activity became more like that of the 
domestic M&A "rising quarter by quarter". Thus, the historical data during this period shows 
that impact of overseas M&A on China's M&A market were growing in importance. 
In the first 11 months of 2013, 80 overseas mergers and acquisitions were completed in China's 
M&A market, accounting for 7.9% of the total volume of M&A transactions, down 22.3% year 
on year. Among them, 64 cases were disclosed, involving a total of 32.179 billion US dollars, 
an increase of 21.0% over the previous year. The growth was mainly attributable to the 
completion of two large transactions in the first and third quarters, which are China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) bought Canadian Nixon for $15.1 billion in February, and 
Henan Shuanghui Investment Development Co., Ltd. acquired Smithfield Food Company of 




In 2012, China's M&A market covered more than 20 first-class industries, such as machinery 
manufacturing, energy and mineral resources, real estate, construction/engineering, 
biotechnology/medical health, etc. Among them, the machinery manufacturing industry 
completed 112 M&A transactions, up 17.9% year-on-year, ranking first in activity, involving 
transactions of $5.08 billion, an increase of 82.2% year-on-year. With the recovery of the 
industry in 2012, the real estate industry triggered a merger and acquisition boom again. Year 
of 2012 were 100 cases involving the industry. The total amount of mergers and acquisitions 
was $3.904 billion, down 11.5% and 28.4% from the year of 2011. 
In 2013, 1,015 M&A transactions completed in China's M&A market were distributed in 23 
first-class industries, including machinery manufacturing, energy and minerals, real estate, 
biotechnology/health, clean technology, electronics and optoelectronic equipment, chemical 
raw materials and processing, telecommunications and value-added services. Among them, 123 
cases were completed in the machinery manufacturing industry, accounting for 12.1% of the 
total, ranking first in the whole industry. The performance of the real estate industry is basically 
the same as that of energy and mineral resources, with 120 cases of mergers and acquisitions 
completed, ranking second with an overall share of 11.8%. The energy and mineral industries 
ranked third were not doing well compared with previous years, with 95 mergers and 
acquisitions completed, accounting for 9.4%. 
This paper focuses the M&A events in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets from January 
1, 2012 to December 31, 2013 as samples. The data were screened and collected according to 
the following criteria: 
(1) Investment Acquisition Company (buyer's company) is an A-share listed company trading 
in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, and there are five-day return data before and after 
the announcement of M&A in the information of Wind database. 
(2) The sample excludes financial companies, because their balance sheets are very different 
from those of general companies, and they are more regulated, so it is more difficult for 




Finally, 1,541 firm-year observation samples were obtained. It is obviously unreasonable to 
mechanically use five or more M&As in three years proposed by Doukas and Petmezas (2007) 
as the criterion for classifying overconfident managers. Therefore, it is necessary to modify the 
indicators proposed by Doukas and Petmezas in view of the situation of Listed Companies in 
China. 
(1) Definition of Time Limit in Indicators 
This paper holds that it is basically reasonable to choose the time limit as one year. This is 
mainly due to consideration of the impact of managerial change. Because the possibility of 
managerial change is very small in one year, although the possibility of managerial change 
cannot be completely ruled out, it can basically minimize the impact. 
(2) Determining the number of Mergers and Acquisitions in Indicators 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) pointed out that "Mergers and acquisitions several times in one 
year are inherently a bad strategy, and probably a measure of overconfidence." Therefore, this 
paper argues that the number of mergers and acquisitions should be determined between one or 
more than one a year, and two and more than two a year. 
Behavioral corporate finance literature (Malmendier & Tate, 2005) highlights that high-
frequency M&A initiated by overconfident managers often destroys value. Therefore, based on 
the prior literature, this paper further examines the short-term performance of all M&A events 
in sample companies. The short-term performance analysis of mergers and acquisitions in this 
paper uses the event study method, which is based on the abnormal returns near the 
announcement day. This paper calculates the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of 5 days (-2, 
to +2) around the announcement date of the M&A with the data provided by Guotai Junan 
database, and measures the wealth effect of M&A. This paper uses the modified market 
adjustment model given by Equation (5) to estimate Abnormal Return (AR): 
                         ARit=Rit-Rmt                      (5) 
Rit is the rate of return of company i and Rmt is the rate of return of market index. The 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is stated in Equation (6): 
                       CARi=∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
2




Table 4-2 reports the Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) mean of all the first two mergers 
and acquisitions of 2012-2013 A share listed companies in China. The results show that the 
average CAR of the first M&A is negative, but not significant, that is to say, there is almost no 
abnormal return. The mean value of CAR in the second acquisition is significantly negative, 
and the mean value of CAR in the second and above acquisitions is also significantly negative. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to choose two times and more than two mergers and acquisitions in 
one year as a criterion for measuring the overconfidence of Chinese listed companies. 
 
Table 4-2 CAR of M&A events by M&A order 
 The 1st M&A The 2nd M&A The 2nd or more M&A 
Cumulative Abnormal 







Note: * * * is significant at the significance level of 1%. Here, mean t test and two sample t test are used. 
 
Drawing on the research ideas of Doukas and Petmezas (2007) and combining the merger and 
acquisition of Listed Companies in China, this paper sets the standard of M&A frequency 
within one year in measuring managerial overconfidence. That is the managers who initiate two 
or more M&As in one year are divided into overconfident managers. Accordingly, the managers 
who initiate less than two M&As in one year are divided into moderately confident managers. 
 
4.3 Descriptive Statistics of Major Variables 
The final sample consisted of 1,541 firm-year observations. Among them, 258 firm-year 
observations are overconfident, 1,283 samples were moderately confident, and 16.8% were 
overconfident. Variable descriptive statistics are reported in Table 4-3. The average and median 
investment size of the overconfidence sample are 0.096 and 0.078, respectively, which are 
higher than the total sample measueres of 0.057 and 0.051, respectively. The average difference 




0.050, which is significant at the 1% level (two samples t-test). This indicates that overconfident 
managers achieve higher levels of investment compared to less confident managers. 
Meanwhile, the mean and median overinvestment levels of overconfidence samples were 0.048 
and 0.031, respectively, which were significantly higher than those of the total sample of 0.001 
and -0.004. The mean difference of overinvestment level between the overconfident sample and 
moderately confidence sample is 0.056, which is significant at the 1% level (two samples t-























Table 4-3 Descriptive Statistical Tables For Variables of Equation 
Panel A Type I Samples - Total Samples 
Variable 
Mean value Median Maximum value Minimum value Standard 
deviation 
Investment 0.057 0.051 0.677 -1.633 0.176 
Overinvestment 0.001 -0.004 0.604 -1.665 0.172 
Confidence 0.153 0 1 0 0.360 
FCFF 0.050 0.072 1.429 -1.314 0.198 
NCFI 0.074 0.035 0.931 -0.195 0.152 
Growth 2.377 1.978 11.385 0.962 1.278 
Leverage 0.490 0.479 7.152 0.030 0.282 
Size 21.208 21.149 24.842 18.111 0.847 
State 0.321 0.315 0.886 0 0.269 
             Panel B  Type II sample - moderate confidence sample 
Variable 
Mean value Median Maximum value Minimum value Standard 
deviation 
Investment 0.046 0.040 0.671 -1.623 0.170 
Overinvestment -0.008 -0.014 0.604 -1.665 0.170 
FCFF 0.049 0.072 1.429 -1.314 0.200 
NCFI 0.072 0.035 0.931 -0.195 0.152 
Growth 2.375 1.989 11.385 0.962 1.269 
Leverage 0.481 0.478 1.908 0.030 0.193 
Size 21.187 21.132 23.873 18.111 0.827 
State 0.324 0.305 0.886 0 0.269 
       Panel C Type III sample - overconfidence sample 
Variable 
Mean value Median Maximum value Minimum value Standard 
deviation 
Investment 0.096 0.078 0.582 -0.966 0.179 
Overinvestment 0.048 0.031 0.526 -1.026 0.178 
FCFF 0.056 0.072 0.875 -0.513 0.186 
NCFI 0.078 0.035 1.032 -0.185 0.169 
Growth 2.388 1.884 8.468 1.031 1.331 
Leverage 0.542 0.500 7.152 0.088 0.561 
Size 21.325 21.233 24.842 19.154 0.942 
State 0.310 0.328 0.850 0 0.271 
53 
 
Chapter 5: Empirical Results 
 
5.1 Managers' Overconfidence and Corporate Investment Scale 
This study examines whether managerial overconfidence affects the scale of corporate 
investment by examining the association between managerial overconfidence and the scale of 
corporate investment on the basis of controlling other characteristics of companies that affect 
the scale of corporate investment. For this reason, this paper estimates equation 1. The variance 
inflation factor was used to test for multicollinearity between the independent variables in each 
of the models. The variance inflation factors show that all independent variables in the model 
are small (all less than 10), indicating that multicollinearity among independent variables is not 
a concern. In order to eliminate the influence of heteroscedasticity, the White heteroscedasticity 
adjustment method is used in the model estimation. In order to test the stability of the results, 
the variables Confidence, FCFF, Growth, Leverage, Size and State were added step by step, 
and the models 1-3 was obtained by stepwise regression. Among them, model 1 introduced 
independent variables Confidence; model 2 introduced independent variables Confidence, 
FCFF; model 3 introduced independent variables Confidence, FCFF, Growth, Leverage, Size 
and State. 
In this paper, the data of 2012-2013 are used, so the annual dummy variable is introduced to 
control the year based on the original model. Because the annual factor belongs to the 
introduction of a single dummy variable, and one factor has only two states, the dummy variable 
adopts the selection principle of "0" and "1", which is defined as follows: D = 0, if the year is 
2012; D = 1, if the year is 2013. 
From the results, we find that the coefficient of Confidence is positive in model 1-3 and highly 
significant at 1% level, which fully demonstrates that managers’ overconfidence has a 




overconfidence of managers leads to the relative expansion of investment scale. Thus, 
hypothesis 1 is verified. 
Of the original 1,541 firm-year samples, manufacturing industry accounted for the largest 
proportion in the industry, a total of 936, representing 60.74% of the sample. This paper chooses 
the manufacturing industry with the largest proportion and establishes a stepwise regression 
model, in which model 4 introduces independent variables Confidence; model 5 introduces 
independent variables Confidence and FCFF; Model 6 introduces independent variables 
Confidence, FCFF, Growth, Leverage, Size and State. The results are as follows: 
Confidence, the overconfidence variable, has a positive coefficient in model 4-6 and is highly 
significant at the 1% level, which fully suggests that managers’ overconfidence is significantly 
associated with the positive impact on the investment scale of the company. That is to say, the 
overconfidence of managers leads to the relative expansion of investment scale. Thus, 
hypothesis 1 is verified. The Confidence coefficient for the manufacturing subsample reported 
in model 6 is 0.065,this compares to the average level of 0.041 (model 3) for the whole sample, 
which indicates that the overconfidence of managers in the manufacturing industry has a higher 
positive effect on the investment scale of the company relative to the average for the whole 
sample. 
In order to avoid the influence of single industry enterprises, we split our data into 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing enterprises subsamples. We find that there is no 
substantial change in the results of the models by comparing manufacturing enterprises and 
non-manufacturing enterprises. This suggests that the hypothetical conclusions of this paper are 










Table 5-1 Empirical Test Results (1) 
Variable Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model7 
Intercept term 
0.0454 *** 
( 12.215 ) 
0.518 *** 
( 7.104 ) 
-0.562 *** 
( -4.459 ) 
 0.033 *** 
( 7.256 ) 
 0.032 *** 
( 7.178 ) 
- 0.499 
*** 
    ( -3.046 ) 
-0.568 *** 




( 5.304 ) 
0.0407 *** 
( 5.319 ) 
0.041 *** 
( 7.148 ) 
 0.065 *** 
    ( 4.098 ) 
 0.065 *** 
( 3.998 ) 
 0.065 
*** 
    ( 3.579 ) 
     0.049 *** 
    ( 4.526 ) 
FCFF   
0.026  
( 0.91 ) 
0.031 *** 
( 2.419 ) 
  
 0.037  
( 1.426 ) 
 0.057 ** 
    ( 2.013 ) 
0.056 ** 
( 2.162 ) 
Growth     
-0.0242 *** 





   ( -3.655 ) 
-0.012 *** 
   ( -2.546 ) 
Leverage     
-0.0358  




   ( -0.778 ) 
-0.008  
   ( -0.564 ) 
Size     
0.0153 *** 
( 3.363 ) 
 
  
     0.041 *** 
    ( 4.791 ) 
0.029*** 
(5.268 ) 
State     
-0.0382 *** 





   ( -2.574 ) 
-0.046*** 












F 16.326 *** 6.518 *** 4.827 *** 13.786 *** 7.548 *** 3.579 ***      2.586 *** 
Adjusted R2 0.025  0.023  0.074   0.045  0.065  0.099       0.0351  
N    1541     1541     1541  936 936 936      605 
Note: The dependent variable of the model is Investment. 
*** means significant at 1%, significant at 5%, significant at 10%, and T in brackets. 
Among them, model 1-model 3 is the whole sample, model 4-6 is the manufacturing sub-sample, and Model 7 is the non-
manufacturing sample. 
 
The 1,541 firm-year companies in the original sample are sorted from large to small. First, the 
top 50% companies with total assets at the end of the period are selected, 770 companies in 
total, and models are established respectively, in which the independent variable Confidence is 
introduced into model 8. The independent variables Confidence and FCFF are introduced in 
model 9. The independent variables Confidence, FCFF, growth, leverage, size and state are 




variable is positive in models 8-10, which is highly significant at the level of 1%, which 
supports a significant positive association between managerial overconfidence and the 
investment scale of the company. In other words, the relative expansion of the company’s 
investment scale is positively reated to managerial overconfidence. This finding is consistent 
with hypothesis 1. In keeping with the earlier finding for large-scale firms, the average 
confidence coefficient for the large-scale subsample, 0.069, is higher than the average level of 
0.041 in the model estimated across all industries for the full sample. The higher coefficient for 
the large-scale subsample indicates that the overconfidence of managers in large-scale 
companies has a higher positive effect on the investment scale of companies. 
In model 11, this study re-estimate the model on small-scale enterprises and find   the results 
to remain consistent with those reported for the full sample further supporting the hypothesis.  
Table 5-2 Empirical Test Results (2) 
Variable Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Intercept term 
0.039 ***  
( 7.893 )  
0.039 ***  
( 7.589 )  
-0.536 ***  
( -3.479 )  
-0.521 ***  
( -4.562 )  
Confidence  
0.069 ***  
( 3.560 )  
0.069 ***  
( 3.987 )  
0.069 ***  
( 4.579 )  
0.049 ***  
( 7.264 )  
FCFF    
0.034  
( 1.546 )  
0.063 **  
( 1.722 )  
0.052 **  
( 1.895 )  
Growth      
-0.017 ***  
( -3.656 )  
-0.010 ***  
( -5.238 )  
Leverage      
-0.016  
( -0.790 )  
-0.011  
( -0.952 )  
Size      
0.050 ***  
( 3.564 )  
0.028 ***  
( 4.526 )  
State      
-0.075 ***  
( -2.411 )  
-0.041 ***  
( -2.856 )  
D  Control year Control year Control year Control year 
F  15.775 ***  9.561 ***  4.458 ***  8.796 ***  
Adjusted R2 0.018  0.018  0.077  0.041  
N     770     770     770     770 
Note: the interpreted variable of the model is investment. 
*** means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively; t value in brackets. 






5.2 Overconfidence of managers and over investment level of the 
company 
In order to test whether managers' overconfidence psychological bias affects the level of over 
investment, this study uses Cai's (2009) model to measure the degree of over investment and 
under investment. The investment expectation model is as follows: 
 
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡              (7) 
 
Investment and Growth are defined as before, FCFF is the company's net cash flow from 
operating activities, which is standardized by total assets. The fitted value from estimating the 
regression model represents the company's moderate (expected) investment on average, while 
the residual value captures that part of the investment expenditure that is unexpected. The 
residual reflects that part of the company’s investment that varies from what is expected on 
average. If the residual is greater than zero, the firm has experienced overinvestment;if the 
residual is less than zero, the firm has experienced underinvestment. The residual is used in the 
second part of the analysis as the independent factor in the model.  
The variance inflation factors for each estimated model were checked to test for 
multicollinearity. For each model the variance inflation factors are small (all less than 10), 
indicating that there is basically no multicollinearity between independent variables. In order 
to eliminate the influence of heteroscedasticity, errors terms adjust for the White’s 
heteroscedasticity are estimated for each reported model. 
A year dummy variable for 2013 is introduced to the original model. Since the annual factor is 
a single dummy variable, and only one factor has two states, the dummy variable adopts the 
selection principle of "0" and "1", which are defined as follows: D = 0, if the year is 2012; d = 




From the results, we find that the overconfidence coefficient is positive in models 12-14, and 
is highly significant at the 1% level. This result is consistent with the assertion that 
overconfident managers has a significant positive impact on the level of over investment. In 
other words, the overconfident managers are associated with firm over investment. Thus, 
hypothesis 2 is verified. In Model 12, the independent variable Confidence is introduced; in 
model 13, the independent variable Confidence and FCFF are introduced; in model 14, the 
independent variables Confidence, FCFF, growth, leverage, size and state are introduced. 
In order to investigate the effect of overconfidence on overinvestment for the manufacturing 
subsample the estimation including the Confidence variable is reported in model 15. The 
independent variable Confidence and FCFF are introduced in model 16. Then the independent 
variable Confidence and FCFF, growth, leverage,size and state are added in Model 17. The 
results for each of these models report a significant and positive overconfidence (1% level) in 
model 15-17. which is highly significant at the level of 1%. This fully shows that the 
overconfidence of managers has a significant positive impact on the level of over investment. 
In other words, the overconfidence of managers leads to the occurrence of over investment. 
Thus, hypothesis 2 is verified. And the consistency coefficient of the model is 0.056 higher than 
the average level of all industries 0.0527, which shows that the overconfidence of managers in 
manufacturing industry has a higher positive impact on the level of over investment. 
Overall the findings show that there is no substantial difference between the test results for the 
models estimated over the full sample and the model that differentiates between manufacturing 












Table 5-3 Empirical Test Results (3) 
Variable Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model  17 Model 18 
Intercept 
term 
-0.0226 ***  
( -5.270 )  
-0.021 ***  
( -3.726 )  
-0.471 ***  
( -3.26 )  
-0.023 ***  
( -3.760 )  
-0.021 ***  
( -3.751 )  
-0.596 ***  
( -3.476 )  
-0.531 ***  
( -3.982 )  
Confidence  
0.0467 ***  
( 4.547 )  
0.058 ***  
( 4.562 )  
0.0527 ***  
( 5.236 )  
0.058 ***  
( 3.879 )  
0.058 ***  
( 3.852 )  
0.056 ***  
( 3.523 )  
0.028 ***  
( 2.956 )  
FCFF    
0.042  
( 1.461 )  
0.0584 **  
( 1.987 )  
  
0.036  
( 1.589 )  
0.059 *  
( 1.563 )  
0.058 *  
( 2.564 )  
Growth      
-0.0364 ***  
( -2.507 )  
    
-0.015 ***  
( -2.786 )  
-0.015 ***  
( -2.564 )  
Leverage      
-0.0223  
( -0.541 )  
    
-0.016  
( -0.788 )  
-0.018  
( -1.045 )  
Size      
0.0456 ***  
( 4.372 )  
    
0.031 ***  
( 3.979 )  
0.026 ***  
( 4.568 )  
State      
-0.0748 ***  
( -2.638 )  
    
-0.047 **  
( -1.087 )  
-0.032 **  
( -0.982 )  
D  Control year Control year Control year Control year Control year Control year Control year 
F  12.475 ***  8.763 ***  3.742 ***  13.795 ***  9.586 ***  4.529 ***  7.584 ***  
Adjusted R2 0.01135  0.0153  0.0154  0.016  0.017  0.089  0.092  
N    1541     1541     1541     936      936     936     605 
Note: the interpreted variable of the model is overinvestment. 
The cash flow is FCFF. 
***It means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively; t value in brackets. 
Among them, model 12-14 is all samples, model 15-17 is manufacturing sub samples, and model 18 is non-manufacturing 
samples 
The 1,541 firm-year companies in the original sample were ranked from large to small, and 770 
companies were selected as the top 50% of total assets at the end of the period. This subsample 
identifies the largest firms in the sample and tests across this group of firms compared to the 
rest of the sample. In model 19, the independent variable Confidence is introduced; in model 
20, the independent variable Confidence and FCFF are introduced; in model 21, the 
independent variables Confidence, FCFF, growth, leverage, size and state are introduced. The 





Table 5-4 Empirical Test Results (4) 
Variable Model 19 Model 20      Model 21 Model 22 
Intercept term 
-0.043*** 
    ( -3.782） 
-0.042*** 
   （-3.762） 
-0.720*** 
   （-3.531） 
-0.562*** 
   （-4.42） 
Confidence  
0.075*** 
    ( 3.457） 
 0.075*** 
    （3.897） 
 0.075*** 
    （3.542） 
 0.049*** 
    （4.521） 
FCFF   
 0.039 
( 1.582 ) 
 0.065* 
    （2.121） 
 0.062* 
     ( 1.895） 
Growth    
     -0.016*** 
   （-3.212） 
 -0.016*** 
    （-2.589） 
Leverage    
-0.015 
   （-0.755） 
 -0.019 
    （-1.058） 
Size    
 0.029***                                            
    ( 3.984 ) 
  0.032***
（4.645） 
State    
-0.077** 
   （-2.243） 
 -0.039** 
    （-1.575） 
D  Control year Control year Control year Control year 
F  14.521***  9.875***  3.898***       2.567*** 
Adjusted R2  0.017  0.017  0.074       0.056 
N   770       770       770   770 
Note: the interpreted variable of the model is overinvestment. 
The cash flow is FCFF 
***It means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively; t value in brackets. 
Among them, model 19-model 21 is the top 50% of the company's sub samples sorted by size, and Model 22 is the small-
scale sample. 
 
Models 19-21 report a significant (1% level) and positive Confidence coefficient. The result 
provides evidence that managerial overconfidence is associated with the level of company 
overinvestment. This result verifies hypothesis 2. The Confidence coefficient reported in model 
21 is 0.075 this is higher than the sensitivity reported for the full model of 0.0527, using all the 
industries. The overconfidence of large-scale managers is more sensitive to the investment scale 
of the company compared to the whole sample. 
In order to avoid the influence of different scale enterprises, as test samples, we find that there 
is no substantial change in the test results of the model by comparing the models of large-scale 





5.3 Investment Behavior of Overconfident Managers and Cash Flow 
from Investment Activities 
This section examines the relationship between managerial overconfidence and the firm’s 
reported cash flow from investment activities. Model 23 shows that the free cash flow 
coefficient, FCFF, is not significant. However, FCFF is positive and significant (5% level) in 
model 24. Hence there is some evidence that the investment scale of the company is indeed 
affected by cash flow. The net cash flow NCFI generated by corporate financing activities is 
positive in models 28-29 and highly significant at the 1% level. This finding suggests that cash 
flow generated by corporate financing activities is related to the level of overinvestment, while 
free cash flow has no significant impact on the level of overinvestment. 
In addition, it is worth noting that the interaction between overconfidence and corporate cash 
flow. The interaction between overconfidence and cash flow generated by investment activities 
reported in model 29 has a positive coefficient in investment activities. This is significant at the 
10% level. The evidence suggests that the investment behavior of overconfident managers is 
sensitive to cash flow, and supports hypothesis 3. Overall the findings imply that under the 
special institutional background of China, the investment behavior of overconfident managers 
is highly sensitive to cash flow generated by investment activities. 
Looking at the other control variables estimate in the model, the growth opportunity variable is 
negatively correlated with the investment scale of the company. This result indicates that the 
larger the investment scale, the market will have doubts about its investment income, resulting 
in a decline in Tobin's Q value. Size is positively correlated with the ratio of assets to liabilities, 
which indicates that large companies have larger assets, smaller risk of bankruptcy, smaller 
information asymmetry and agency problems, so they can obtain investment funds at lower cost. 
At the same time, larger companies usually have higher and stable free cash flow, and have 
sufficient funds to invest, so the investment scale is larger. Unexpectedly, the state-owned 




possible explanation is that the macro-policy of China's economic reform leads to the relatively 
small investment scale of the company and a higher state-owned equity ratio during the sample 
period. 
 
Table 5-5 Empirical Test Results (5) 
Variable    Model 23  Model 24 Model 25 Model 26      Model 27 
Intercept term 
    0.0438*** 
   ( 7.05) 
   -0.581*** 
 （-4.357） 
  0.031*** 
（7.223） 
-0.498*** 
   （-3.045） 
  -0.568*** 
（-4.552） 
Confidence  
    0.041*** 
   ( 5.453)                                                        
    0.0407***   
（7.529）                                                                                                                               
  0.066*** 
（3.968）
 0.062*** 
    （3.578）





    0.0364** 
（1.974） 
  0.036 
（1.375） 
 0.056** 
    （2.011） 
   0.056** 






  -0.025 
（-0.421） 
 0.012* 
    （1.834） 
    0.001* 
  （1.895） 
Growth   





   -0.012*** 
 （-2.546） 





    （-0.781） 
   -0.008 
 （-0.564） 






   0.029*** 
 （5.268） 





    （-2.578） 
   -0.046*** 
 （-5.644） 
D  Control year Control year Control year Control year Control year 
F  7.584*** 5.44*** 5.897***  3.578***         2.586*** 
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.068 0.066  0.098         0.0351 
N     1541     1541      936       936         605 
Note: The interpreted variable of the model is Investment. The cash flow variable is free cash flow FCFF. 
*** means significant at 1%, significant at 5%, significant at 10%, and T in brackets. 











Table 5-6 Empirical Test Results (6) 
Variable Model 28 Model 29 Model 30 Model 31 Model 32 
Intercept term 
    0.0501*** 
  （7.54） 
-0.586*** 
   （-4.249） 
    0.03078*** 
（7.108） 
-0.4882*** 
  （-3.047） 
-0.558*** 
  （-4.32） 
Confidence 
    0.043*** 
   ( 5.407) 
  0.0403*** 
    （7.346） 




  0.0481*** 




  0.0369*** 
   （16.780） 
0.0374 
（1.46） 
    0.0558** 
  （2.031） 
  0.0586** 
   （2.18） 
Confidence   *NCFI 
-0.0756 
（-0.413） 
      0.00382* 
    （1.96） 
-0.0246 
（-0.59） 
   0.0118* 
(1.82) 
     0.001* 
   （1.905） 
Growth  
  -0.02294*** 
   （-2.429） 
 
    -0.018*** 
 （-3.585） 
  -0.0141*** 
  （-2.547） 
Leverage  
     -0.0306 




    -0.0082 
  （-0.912） 
Size  
      0.0139*** 




    0.0293*** 
（5.233） 
State  
     -0.041*** 






D Control year Control year Control year Control year Control year 
F  7.895*** 5.715*** 5.582*** 3.76*** 2.603*** 
Adjusted R2 0.0131         0.0558 0.0645 0.0985 0.0354 
N     1541 1541     936     936     605 
Note: the interpreted variable of the model is investment. Cash flow is net cash flow NCFI. 
***It means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively; t value in brackets. 
Among them, models 28-29 are all samples, models 30-31 are manufacturing sub samples, and models 32 are non-
manufacturing sam 
 
The interaction between overconfidence and corporate cash flow generated by investment 
activities has a positive coefficient in investment activities, that is significant at the 10% level. 
The finding shows that the investment behavior of overconfident managers is associated with 
cash flow, and is consistent with hypothesis 3. Specifically, during the period of this study that 
coincides with the special institutional background of China, the investment behavior of 




Finally, there is no substantial change in the results for the model when comparing the 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing enterprises. This result verifies hypothesis 3.  
The relationship between overconfidence and overinvestment is examined by comparing small- 
and large-scaled enterprises. The models are refitted for the sample with the 770- large-scaled 
firms identified by a dummy variable. The results are reported in Table 5-7, that is significate 
at the 10% level. 
 
Table 5-7 Empirical Test Results (7) 
Variable   Model 33  Model 34 Model 35 
Intercept term 
    0.038*** 
  （7.752） 
   -0.538*** 
（-3.478） 
    -0.524*** 
（-4.026） 
Confidence 
    0.070*** 
  （3.953） 
    0.068*** 
（4.578） 





    0.062** 
（1.921） 










    -0.018*** 
（-3.658） 

















D Control year Control year Control year 
F 5.641*** 4.457*** 8.151*** 
Adjusted R2 0.018 0.076 0.0127 
N     770     770      770 
Note: the interpreted variable of the model is investment. 
***It means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively; t value in brackets. 










Table 5-8 Empirical Test Results (8) 
Variable Model 36 Model 37 Model 38 
Intercept term 
    0.0366*** 
（7.23） 
   -0.527*** 
（-3.43） 
    -0.522*** 
（-4.363） 
Confidence 
    0.071*** 
（3.827） 
    0.066*** 
（4.287） 





    0.067** 
（1.922） 
    0.052** 
（1.895） 








    -0.018*** 
（-3.651） 
    -0.011*** 
















D Control yea Control yea Control yea 
F 5.723*** 4.691*** 8.651*** 
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.078 0.0483 
N     770     770     770 
Note: the interpreted variable of the model is investment. 
*** means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively; t value in brackets. 
Among them, model 36-37 is the top 50% of the company's sub samples sorted by size, and model 38 is the small-scale 
 
An examination of the interaction between overconfidence and corporate cash from investment 
activities, reports a positive coefficient that is significant at the 10% level. This result provides 
some evidence that investment behavior of overconfident managers is sensitive to cash flow, 
and verifies hypothesis 3. Based on the period of this study under the special institutional 
background of China, the investment behavior of overconfident managers is highly sensitive to 
cash flow generated by investment activities. 
A comparison of the models estimated for large- and small-scale enterprise as reported in Table 




Chapter 6: Case Study 
 
This study selects two specific cases of Chinese listed companies to expand the practical 
significance of the study. First, Xuzhou Construction Machinery Group Co., Ltd. (XCMG), 
which represents manufacturing industry and large-scale enterprise samples. Second, LeTV, 
which represents non-manufacturing industry and small-scale enterprise samples, respectively. 
 
6.1 Xuzhou Construction Machinery Group Co., Ltd. (XCMG) 
Xuzhou Construction Machinery Group Co., Ltd. (XCMG), is located in Xuzhou City, Jiangsu 
Province, China. It was listed on Shenzhen Stock Exchange on August 28, 1996 with the stock 
code of 000425. 
According to the introduction of the official website of XCMG, XCMG was founded on 
December 15, 1993. Business scope includes: construction machinery and complete equipment, 
special vehicle, construction machinery, material handling equipment and accessories, mining 
machinery, sanitation machinery, commercial vehicle, truck, engineering machinery engine, 
general basic parts, instruments, meters, weighing apparatus manufacturing, processing, sales 
and maintenance; environmental protection engineering construction; second-hand vehicle 
machinery remanufacturing, acquisition, sales and leasing rent. Among them, many core 
products such as truck crane, truck crane, roller, asphalt concrete paver, grader, cold milling 
planer, high-rise jet fire truck and many other components such as hydraulic parts of 
construction machinery occupy the first market share in China. XCMG machinery has the most 
advanced processing equipment and the most skilled industrial workers in the concrete 
machinery industry, with marketing channels covering all parts of the country and a global 
marketing network. It is one of the largest exporters of construction machinery in China, with 
the largest market share of many products such as truck crane, roller, grader, etc. In 2012, 
XCMG machinery ranked 15th in the world's construction machinery industry, 150th in China's 




enterprise group with the largest scale, the most complete product varieties and series, the most 
competitive and influential in China's construction machinery industry. 
Wang Min, chairman of XCMG, who is in charge of XCMG, continues to lead China's 
construction machinery industry, and is rated as "national excellent entrepreneur", "National 
Star entrepreneur of machinery industry", and won the "most influential industrial leader award 
of China's construction machinery". Under his leadership, XCMG machinery acquired 
Netherlands AMCA Co., Ltd. in 2012, accounting for 100% of the shares; in the same year, 
XCMG machinery acquired Krefeld luitronics Co., Ltd. of Germany, accounting for 100% of 
the shares; the German XS Company, accounting for 60%; Under the leadership of Wang Min, 
XCMG acquired German SCHWING Co., Ltd. in 2013, accounting for 60%; American Litong 
Machinery Co., Ltd., accounting for 51%; and polish construction and road machinery plant. 
The 2012-2013 is the peak period of XCMG's overseas M&A, and also the period when Wang 
Min, chairman of the board of directors, is full of confidence. In 2012, there were three 
investment mergers and acquisitions, and in 2013, three investment mergers and acquisitions, 
which are in line with the measurement indicators of overconfidence of managers in this paper. 
The following uses the ratio between the added value of long-term assets and the total assets at 
the beginning of the period of 2012-2013 of XCMG machinery to illustrate that the 
overconfidence of managers has led to the relative expansion of the company's investment scale 
(see Table 6-1). 
 
Table 6-1 Ratio of Added of Long-term Assets to Total Assets at The Beginning of  
2012-2013 
Ratio of added value of long-term assets to 
total assets at the beginning of the period 
2012 2013 
Ratio of construction machinery industry% 0.052 0.057 
XCMG ratio% 0.601 0.613 
Data source: Wind data 
 
XCMG acquired German SCHWING company, which contributed to the formation of an 




of SCHWING Co., Ltd. has greatly improved the core competitiveness and overall strength of 
XCMG in the field of medium and high-end concrete complete equipment, thus promoting the 
rapid development of XCMG's mechanical concrete complete equipment, promoting XCMG's 
machinery to reach the international first-class level in production technology, product quality, 
product research and development, production and manufacturing, and building an international 
brand for XCMG. The concrete package provides conditions and possibilities. 
There is still a gap between XCMG and the world's advanced level in concrete machinery 
manufacturing. Together with SCHWING Co., Ltd., XCMG can complement each other's 
advantages and achieve a win-win situation. At the same time that XCMG has obtained the 
technology, channel and brand influence of SCHWING Co., Ltd., it has also solved its financing 
problem. In addition, thanks to XCMG's broad market in domestic concrete, SCHWING Co., 
Ltd. has also obtained the market in China. Together with XCMG, SCHWING Co., Ltd. not 
only achieved a good combination with the Chinese market, but also gained the world market. 
The fluitronics hydraulic R&D and production center in Krefeld, Germany and AMCA Co., 
Ltd. in the Netherlands, which XCMG acquired, are family businesses. Due to the conflict in 
the inheritance of family businesses, they are willing to sell. The two companies have 
previously supplied parts for XCMG machinery, and their hydraulic components represent the 
international advanced level. The two companies have previously supplied parts for XCMG 
machinery, and their hydraulic components represent the international advanced level. After 
the successful merger and acquisition of XCMG machinery, in order to further break through 
the bottleneck of hydraulic technology and realize the independent design and manufacture of 
hydraulic valves, they invested 15.8 million euros to purchase 10,000 square meters of land 
near the original site of fluitronics hydraulic electronic system factory, and registered fluitronics 
hydraulic electronic system factory and XCMG machinery European R&D center. 
Concurrent with the small increase in inventory, the product sales volume of XCMG machinery 
in 2013 decreased by 14.63% compared with that in 2012, and the production volume also 




and bank loans caused by overseas M&A, the interest expense of XCMG machinery increased 
by 118% year on year. 
 
Table 6-2 Financial Indicators of XCMG Machinery in 2012-2013 
 
2013 2012 
  Before adjustment     After adjustment    
Operating revenue (billion yuan)       27        32        32   
Net profit (billion yuan)     1.5   2.4    2.4   
Net cash flow from  
Operating activities (billion  
yuan)   
 -0.4    -3.5    -3.5   
Weighted average return on equity 
(%)    
 8.35%    15.3%    15.13%   
Total assets (billion yuan)         49    45    46   
Net assets (billion yuan)       19    17    17   
Data source: Wind data 
 
Wang Min, as a manager, ignored the future net cash inflow of investment projects because of 
overconfidence, which led to the investment level exceeding the normal rational level. 
6.2 LeTV 
LeTV (full name: LeTV Information Technology Co., Ltd.), founded in 2004, formerly known 
as Beijing LeTV Star Information Technology Co., Ltd. The original capital of LeTV is 50 
million yuan, of which Jia Yueting, the founder, contributed 45 million yuan, accounting for 
90%. 
In August 2010, LeTV was listed in Shenzhen stock exchange through a series of operations, 
stock code: 300104. At that time, it was the first online video enterprise listed in A-share in 
China, causing a sensation in the industry. LeTV's share price has been rising since its listing, 
and the company's market value has reached 4 billion yuan. LeTV has been adhering to the idea 
of "Internet +". It is very characteristic to build a "platform + content + terminal + application" 
full industrial chain model, including a series of new Internet industrial models such as network 




of framework and nine kinds of content. The four layer architecture is mainly composed of 
platform layer, content layer, application layer, and terminal layer. Jia Yueting is the chairman 
and general manager of the company, who has both management right and decision-making 
right. A considerable part of the top management of LeTV is the backbone personnel who 
follow Jia Yueting from the establishment of LeTV to the listing and then to the rapid 
development. There is no doubt about Jia Yueting's personal influence, so Jia Yueting has an 
absolute voice in the strategic decision-making of the company and is the actual controller of 
the enterprise. Therefore, the author believes that the influence of LeTV's managers' 
overconfidence on the investment decision-making is mainly the influence of Jia Yueting's 
overconfidence on the investment decision-making. 
Under the leadership of Jia Yueting, LeTV acquired Tianjin Zhixin Electronics Co., Ltd. in 
2012, established LeTV TV business department and conducted independent accounting. In the 
same year, LeTV acquired Wangjiu.com. In 2013, it invested in LeTV mall and LeTV 
respectively, and acquired Flower film and new media of LeTV. In 2012, there were two 
investment M&As and four investment M&As in 2013, which are in line with the measurement 
indicators of overconfidence of managers in this paper. 
Adhering to the advanced operation mode and constantly seeking to be ahead of all enterprises, 
Jia Yueting has promoted the rapid expansion and development of LeTV. 2012-2013 is the two 
years of rapid expansion of LeTV. The following uses the ratio of the added value of LeTV's 
long-term assets in 2012-2013 to the total assets at the beginning of the period to illustrate that 
managers' overconfidence has led to the relative expansion of the company's investment scale 
(see Table 6-3). 
Table 6-3 Ratio of added value of long-term assets to total assets at the beginning of  
2012-2013 
Ratio of added value of long-term assets to total assets at the 
beginning of the period 
2012 2013 
Internet industry ratio% 0.055 0.059 
LeTV ratio% 0.639 0.658 




In the process of LeTV's investment management, the investment field is relatively broad, with 
12% used for e-commerce network investment, 17% for new energy projects, 19% for 
household appliances industry projects, etc. According to the open market data, LeTV 
completed the acquisition of Tianjin Zhixin Electronics Co., Ltd. to establish LeTV TV business 
from 2012 to 2013, and spent 10.7 billion yuan on the acquisition of Wangjiu.com, investment 
in LeTV mall, LeTV TV, acquisition of Flower film and new media of LeTV. It is generally 
believed that the development of diversification will disperse the risks of enterprise 
management, but not all diversification is beneficial to the enterprise. Because LeTV network 
is lack of "hematopoietic capacity" and capital, excessive investment will restrict the 
development of the enterprise, and even cause serious risks to LeTV. For example, Jia Yueting 
vigorously promoted LeTV's investment in charging piles. Although the project has a good 
prospect and is also supported by the government, but due to the low share of pure electric 
vehicles in the Chinese market, its market coverage is still very low at present, so the project 
cannot be quickly turned into a profitable project of LeTV after completion, and even needs 
LeTV's continuous investment and blood transfusion. Jia Yueting, as a manager, overestimates 
the future net cash inflow of investment projects due to overconfidence, and ignores the real 
investment value of investment projects, which leads to the occurrence of LeTV's over 
investment behavior. 
Table 6-4 Investment funds of LeTV from 2012 to 2013 
Project 2012  2013 
Cash inflow from investment activities 1,150.00 1,001.75 
Cash outflow from investment activities 77,530.73 90,768.45 
Net cash flow from investment activities -76,380.73 -89,766.70 
Net cash flow from operating activities 10,619.99 17,585.14 
Note: unit: 10000 yuan 






As a representative of the manufacturing industry and large-scale enterprise firms in China's 
listed companies, XCMG machinery invested and acquired three times in 2012 and three times 
in 2013 under the leadership of Wang Min, the manager and chairman of the board of directors. 
LeTV, as a representative of non-manufacturing and small-scale enterprises in China's listed 
companies, invested and acquired twice in 2012 and four times in 2013 under the leadership of 
Jia Yueting, the manager and chairman. Both of them are in line with the classification of 
overconfident managers in this study, initiate two or more M&A within one year. Wang Min 
and Jia Yueting, as overconfidence managers defined in this study, overestimated their 
decision-making ability and judgment ability in the investment decision-making process of 
XCMG and LeTV, overestimated the income or underestimated the risk of the investment 
project, and preferred to engage in investment activities, thus blindly expanding the relative 
investment scale. Overestimating the future net cash inflow of investment projects and ignore 
the real investment value of investment projects, which leads to the investment level exceeding 
the normal rational level. The investment scale of XCMG and LeTV is positively related to 
cash flow, which also proves that the listed companies in China have the problem of that most 
managers in Chinese Listed Companies are paying more attention on financing activities rather 
than investment activities. 
 









Chapter 7: Pilot Study 
 
This thesis conducts a robustness test of the relation between manager oveconfidence and firm 
overinvestment by using the executive compensation as a second proxy to measure managers' 
overconfidence. The results are reported in this pilot study. Previous studies have shown that 
the higher the CEO's salary relative to other managers in the company, the more important the 
CEO's status and the more likely it is that the CEO is overconfident (Hayward and Hambrick, 
1997). Brown and Sarma (2007) found that the higher the manager's salary ratio, the stronger 
his/her control and study uses this to quantify overconfident managers. 
Sample Description: All 30 samples are from A-share listed companies in China. Financial 
enterprises and ST (Special Trade) enterprises are excluded from all A-share listed enterprises 
in this study. Only the data of listed enterprises in 2012 and 2013 are kept, and the data of 30 
enterprises in these two years are selected as samples. All sample data are from the Wind 
database. Table 7-2 and Table 7-3 report the A-share securities code, company name, industry 
and time of the sample enterprise, respectively. 
Table 7-1 Definition and description of variables 
Variable Name Variable Definition Variable Description 
Investment Investment Expenditure Scale of Company 
Value added of long-term assets/total assets at the beginning 
of the period 
Overinvestment Overinvestment Level of  Companies Residual term from investment expectation model 
Confidence 
Alternative variables of Managerial 
Overconfidence 
When the average pay of high-ranking company administers 
in a company is greater than the industry’s average, 
confidence=1, otherwise it’s zero. 
FCFF Company's free cash flow 
(Net Profit after Tax + Interest Cost + Non-Cash 
Expenditure) - Operating Capital Addition - Capital 
Expenditure 
NCFI 
Net Cash Flow from Corporate Investment 
Activities 
Cash and cash equivalents inflow (income) - outflow 
(expenditure) 
Growth Growth Opportunities of Companies Use Tobin Q value to measure 
Leverage Asset liability ratio of the company Total Liabilities/Total Assets *100% 
Size Company size Use the natural logarithm of total assets to measure 
State 
The proportion of state-owned shares in the 
company 
Expressed as the percentage of state-owned shares in the 
total shares of the enterprise 




Table 7-2 Sample Note 1: Securities code, Company Name and Time 
Stock Code Name Year 
000005 SHENZHEN FOUNTAIN CORRORATION 2012 
000020 SHENZHEN HUAFA ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 2012 
000599 QINGDAO DOUBLESTAR SHOE MANUFACTURING CO., LTD. 2013 
000733 CHINA ZHENHUA (GROUP) SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 2013 
000803 SICHUAN MEIYA SILK (GROUP) CO. 2013 
000878 YUNNAN COPPER INDUSTRY CO., LTD. 2013 
002051 CHINA CAMC ENGINEERING CO., LTD. 2012 
002055 SHENZHEN DEREN ELECTRONIC CO., LTD. 2012 
002065 BEIJING DHC DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 2012 
002108 CANGZHOU MINGZHU PLASTIC CO., LTD. 2013 
002110 SANSTEEL MINGUANG CO., LTD., FUJIAN 2013 
002210 SHENZHEN FEIMA INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAIN CO., LTD. 2013 
002247 ZHEJIANG DILONG NEW MATERIAL CO., LTD. 2013 
002465 GUANGZHOU HAIGE COMMUNICATIONS GROUP INCORPORATED COMPANY 2013 
002513 JIANGSU LANFENG BIO-CHEMICAL CO., LTD 2012 
002518 SHENZHEN KSTAR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD 2013 
300133 ZHEJIANG HUACE FILM & TV CO., LTD 2013 
300151 SHENZHEN CHANGHONG MOLD TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD 2013 
600072 JIANGNAN HEAVY INDUSTRY CO., LTD. 2013 
600252 GUANGXI WUZHOU ZHONGHENG GROUP CO.,LTD 2012 
600267 ZHEJIANG HISUN PHARMACEUTICAL CO.,LTD. 2013 
600410 BEIJING TEAMSUN TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD 2013 
600521 ZHEJIANG HUAHAI PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD. 2012 
600559 HEBEI YUFENG INDUSTRY CO., LTD. 2013 
600724 NINGBO FUDA ELECTRIC APPLIANCE CO., LTD. 2013 
600859 BEIJING WANGFUJING DEPARTMENT STORE (GROUP) CO., LTD. 2012 
600883 YUNNAN FORTUNE SCIENCE&TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD 2013 
600995 YUNNAN WENSHAN ELECTRIC POWER CO., LTD 2012 
601299 CHINA CNR CORPORATION LIMITED 2012 


















Table 7-3 Sample Note 2: Industry 
Stock Code Industry 
000005 Comprehensive 
000020 Electronic equipment manufacturing for daily use 
000599 Rubber manufacturing industry 
000733 Electronic component manufacturing industry 
000803 Textile industry 
000878 Nonferrous metal smelting and rolling processing industry 
002051 The construction industry 
002055 Electronic component manufacturing industry 
002065 Computer Application Service Industry 
002108 Plastic manufacturing industry 
002110 Ferrous metal smelting and calendaring industry 
002210 Warehousing 
002247 Other manufacturing industries 
002465 Communication and related equipment manufacturing industry 
002513 Chemical pesticide manufacturing industry 
002518 Electrical machinery and equipment manufacturing 
300133 Radio, film and television 
300151 Manufacturing of special equipment 
600072 Manufacturing of special equipment 
600252 Comprehensive 
600267 Pharmaceutical manufacturing industry 
600410 Computer Application Service Industry 
600521 Pharmaceutical manufacturing industry 
600559 Beverage manufacturing industry 
600724 Electrical machinery and equipment manufacturing 
600859 Retail 
600883 Cement products and asbestos-cement products 
600995 The production and supply of electricity, steam and hot water 
601299 Transportation equipment manufacturing industry 
600267 Pharmaceutical manufacturing industry 
 
The regression results reported in Table 7-5 for the corresponding regression equations from 
hypothesis 1, 2 and 3. Equation 1 corresponds to hypothesis one; equation 2 corresponds to 
hypothesis two; equation 3 and equation 4 correspond to hypothesis three. 
From equation 1, the Confidence coefficient estimate is 0.1437, and is significant at the 1% 
level. The finding confirms a significant and positive association between managerial 
overconfidence and the scale of investment in listed companies. The result confirms Hypothesis 
one. The estimated coefficients for the control variables show that there is a significant 
association between the corporate asset-liability ratio (negative), the enterprise size (positive), 
and the estimated coefficient of state-owned share proportion (negative). The growth 
opportunity of enterprises is not significant. 
Overinvestment is the dependent variable in the model given by equation 2. The results reported 




result shows a positive significant association between overconfidence of senior executives and 
the overinvestment of listed companies. This result supports hypothesis two.  
Equations 3 and 4 use enterprise investment scale as the dependent variable. The results from 
equations 1 and 3, which includes the interaction term of Confidence and FCFF, the estimated 
Confidence coefficient is consistent with equation 1.The estimated coefficient for the 
interaction term is 0.1631 (p-value of less than 10%) that is marginally significant so there is 
some evidence that overconfidence is associated with firm overinvestment.  
Equation 4, uses NCFI rather than FCFF and adds the interaction term between Confidence and 
NCFI. The estimated coefficient for the interaction term is 0.4097 is not significant. In summary, 
the regression estimates for Equations 3 and 4 do not provide strong support for Hypothesis 3, 
and Hypothesis 3 is not verified. 
Table 7-4 Descriptive Statistical Tables for Variables of Equation 
Variable  Mean   Median  Maximum  Minimun  Standard Deviation 
Investment 0.06 0.062 0.195 -0.143 0.088 
Overinvestment 0.006 0 0.099 -0.042 0.035 
Confidence 0.5 0.5 1 0 0.509 
NCFI -0.061 -0.016 0.047 -0.607 0.119 
Growth 1.91 1.653 6.789 0.985 1.085 
Leverage 0.488 0.494 0.899 0.072 0.209 
Size 22.116 21.972 25.391 20.012 1.229 
State 0.012 0 0.153 0 0.035 













Table 7-5 Empirical Test Results 
Variables Equation1 Equation2 Equation3 Equation4 
Intercept term -0.4735*** -0.1472* -0.5723*** -0.6611*** 
 (-5.08) (-1.92) (-5.47) (-5.31) 
Confidence 0.1437*** 0.0611*** 0.1379*** 0.1480*** 
 (12.74) (6.60) (12.28) (13.25) 
FCFF 0.0912** -0.0333 0.0414  
 (2.72) (-1.21) (0.98)  
NCFI    -0.2651 
    (-0.88) 
Confidence*FCFF   0.1631*  
   (1.79)  
Confidence*NCFI    0.4097 
    (1.43) 
Growth 0.0035 -0.0005 0.0022 0.0026 
 (0.73) (-0.12) (0.46) (0.57) 
Leverage -0.0949*** 0.0344 -0.0957*** -0.1045*** 
 (-3.19) (1.41) (-3.38) (-3.66) 
Size 0.0233*** 0.0041 0.0281*** 0.0325*** 
 (5.15) (1.10) (5.53) (5.35) 
State -0.3628** -0.2496** -0.2771* -0.4484*** 
 (-2.62) (-2.19) (-1.97) (-3.53) 
D control year control year control year control year 
F 56.04*** 10.61*** 54.33*** 55.45*** 
Adjusted R2 0.930 0.699 0.936 0.938 
N 30 30 30 30 
Note: The interpreted variable of the model is Investment. 
The cash flow variable is free cash flow FCFF. 
*** means significant at 1%, significant at 5%, significant at 10%, and T in brackets  
 
Using the pilot study of 30 companies from different industries of A-share listed companies as 
the observation sample, and using the relative compensation of managers as a measurement of 
overconfidence, the results show that, consistent with the theory of managerial overconfidence, 
overconfident Chinese managers demonstrate a positive association with the scale of 
investment, and the level of corporate overinvestment; firms that are managed by overconfident 
managers and also experience larger levels of free cash flows are associated with higher levels 













Chapter 8: Research Summary, Drawbacks and 
Prospects 
 
8.1 Research Summary 
This paper re-examines the association between managerial overconfidence and firm 
investment during a specific regulated period (i.e.2012-2013) in China's capital market 
development. The study tests the theoretical predictions between the behavior of overconfident 
managers and the level of firm investment and overinvestment. 
Evaluating the relevant literature, this paper expounds the internal relationship between 
managers’ overconfidence and enterprise investment decision-making. According to the data 
for listed companies in China, those firms that complete two or more mergers or acquisitions 
per year are defined as firms with overconfident managers. Based on the sample of non-
financial A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges that 
underwent mergers diring 2012-2013 as our final sample, this paper empirically reports 
evidence of a significant positive association between: (i) managers overconfidence and the 
investment scale of the company; (ii) manager overconfidence and the level of corporate 
overinvestment; and (iii) that firms with overconfident managers in firms with higher levels of 
free cash flows are associated with higher levels of investment activity 
The study and its findings are relevant to the following parties: (1) shareholders and other 
stakeholders who are interested in monitoring manager overconfidence to ensure that managers 
are optimizing firm value; (2) market regulatory authorities who need to consider the costs and 
benefits of greater regulation around M&A activity and the provision of more market-based 
financing channels, particularly as the Chinese capital market grows. 
As the global economy continues to develop at a fast pace, companies need to seek expansion 
and development in various ways to compete for market share. Mergers and acquisitions are 
the most important means by which enterprises can expand, develop, transform, and enhance 




the level of engagement in M&A by Chinese firms only started to grow in 2012. The China’s 
capital market is not yet fully diversified. In addition to horizontal M&A in the same industry, 
vertical M&A for firms both upstream and downstream, diversified M&A, leveraged M&A, 
and strategy development are applications from which firms can benefit through the purchase 
and amalgamation with other firms over time. The findings of this thesis serve as a reminder to 
enterprise managers and their owners to recognize the importance of behavioral finance to 
corporate investment decisions. In particular, the results suggest that there is a need to monitor 
overconfidence and other behavioral psychological deviations in the deeper and broader 
development of China's capital market. This type of regulatory intervention can help companies 
to achieve short-term returns, maximize the long-term value of the corporation, and effectively 
avoid investment distortions. 
 
8.2 Research Drawbacks and Prospects 
This thesis takes listed companies in China as research samples, and through theoretical and 
empirical research on the relationship between managerial overconfidence and corporate 
investment decision-making, this study provides supporting empirical evidence for corporate 
behavioral finance theory from the perspective of managerial irrationality. However, as the 
research in this area is still exploratory, there are still a lot of deficiencies that need to be further 
improved in this paper. 
1. While the pilot study provides evidence of robust findings the short sample period suggests 
that a longer time frame for the analysis will add more reliability to the main conclusions. 
Considering the maturity of China's capital market and the change of accounting standards, this 
paper demonstrates the use of M&A frequency as a measure of managerial overconfidence, 
using the data of Listed Companies in China from 2012 to 2013. The short data span brings 
some risks to the reliability and robustness of the conclusions. The future research direction of 
this paper is to supplement more detailed data for more in-depth research to test the reliability 




2. The indicators of managerial overconfidence designed in this paper still need to be tested by 
in-depth research in the future. The design of managerial overconfidence measurement 
indicators is a worldwide problem in the field of behavioral corporate finance. Many scholars 
have made bold attempts and explorations, put forward some alternative variables, and tested 
them with empirical evidence. However, scholars in China and abroad do not have a unified 
understanding of this issue. This paper proposes to measure managers’ overconfidence by using 
mergers and acquisitions of two or more in a year. In China, it is quite novel. Although this 
paper preliminarily demonstrates the rationality and feasibility of the index, it still needs to be 
verified by future in-depth research and other scholars’ related research. 
3. This study only considers the psychological and behavioral bias of managers’ overconfidence. 
In the future, besides researching managers’ overconfidence, other psychological and 
behavioral biases of managers' irrationality can be introduced into the research, such as typical 
inference, regret aversion, loss aversion, and so on, so as to further expand the research field 
and capture a wider range of managers’ irrationality. 
4. This thesis only deals with the irrationality of managers, and does not consider the 
irrationality of investors. But in reality, capital market inefficiency and the irrationality of 
investors often exist together. Therefore, future research might also consider examining the 














[1] Alicke, M. D., & Yurak, T. J. (1995). Perpetrator Personality and Judgments of 
Acquaintance Rape, Journal of Applied Social Psychology, (25): 1900-1921. 
[2] Aktas, N., De Bondt, E., & Roll, R. (2006). Hubris, Learn- ing, and M&A Decisions: 
Empirical Evidence, Working Paper (University of California at Los Angeles).  
[3] Barberis , N., & Thaler, R. (2003). A Survey of Behavioral Finance, Handbook of the 
Economics of Finance, (18): 1053-1128. 
[4] Barros, L., & Silveira, M. (2007). Overconfidence, Managerial Optimism and the 
Determinants of Capital Structure, SSRN Working Paper.  
[5] Baker, M. P., Ruback, R. S., & Wurgler, J. A. (2004). Behavioral Corporate Finance, NYU 
Working Paper No, FIN-04-024. 
[6] Ben-David, I., Graham, J. R., & Harvey, C. R. (2006). Managerial Miscalibration, The  
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 4: 1547–1584. 
[7] Bettman, J. R., & Weitz, B. A. (1983). Attributions in the Board Room: Causal Reasoning 
in Corporate Annual Reports, Administrative Science Quarterly, 28: 165-183. 
[8] Brown, T. A., & Zorn, A. (2006). Managerial optimism and market misvaluation: The 
effects on mergers and acquisitions, ETD collection for University of Nebraska - Lincoln.  
[9] Brown, R., & Sarma, N. (2007). CEO Overconfidence, CEO Dominance and Corporate 
Acquisitions, Journal of Economics and Business, (59): 0-379. 
[10] Billet, M., & Qian, Y. M. (2008). Are Overconfidence CEOs Born or Made? Evidence of 
Self-Attribution Bias from Frequent Acquirers, Managerment Sciences Working Paper. 
[11] Camerer, A., & Lovallo, H. (1999). Overconfidence and Excess Entry: an Experimental 
Approach, American Economic Review, 89: 306-318. 
[12] Cooper, A. C., Woo, C., & Dunkelberg, W. (1998). Entrepreneurs Perceived Chances for 
Success, Journal of Business Venturing, 3: 97-108. 
[13] Cordeiro, L. (2009). Managerial Overconfidence and Dividend Policy, Social Science 




[14] De Bondt, W. F. M., & Thalter, R. (1985). Does the Stock Market Overreact?， Journal 
of Finance 40, 793–808.  
[15] Doukas, J., & Petmezas, D. (2007). Acquisitions, Overconfident Managers and Self-
attribution Bias, European Financial Management, 13(3): 531-577. 
[16] Donaldson, G. (1961). Corporate Debt Capacity: A Study of Corporate Debt Policy and 
the Determination of Corporate Debt Capacity，Division of Research, Graduate School of 
Business Administration, Harvard University. 
[17] Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (2011). Capital Structure Choices, Available at SSRN 
Working Paper. 
[18] Fairchild, R. (2009). Managerial overconfidence, moral hazard problems, and excessive 
life-cycle debt sensitivity, Investment Management and Financial Innovations, 6(3).  
[19] Gao, L., & Sudarsanam, P.S. (2005). Executive Compensation, Hubris, Corporate 
Governance: Impact on Managerial Risk Taking and Value Creation in UK High-tech and Low-
tech Acquisitions，SSRN Electronic Journal. 
[20] Gervais, S., & Odean, T. (2001). Learning to be overconfidence, Review of Financial 
Studies, 14:1-27. 
[21] Gervais, S., Heaton, J. B., & Odean, T. (2002). The Positive Role of overconfidence and 
Optimism in Investment Policy，University of California Berkley, Working Paper. 
[22] Gilson, S. (1989). Management Turnover and Financial Distress, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 25: 241-262. 
[23] Goel, A. M., & Thakor, A. V. (2008). Overconfidence, CEO Selection, and Corporate 
governance，Journal of Financial Economics, 63(6): 2737- 2784. 
[24] Glaser, M., Schfaaers, P., & Weber, M. (2008). Managerial Optimism and Corporate 
Investment: Is the CEO Alone Responsible for the Relation?，Social ence Electronic Publishing. 
[23] Griffin, D., & Tversky, A. (1992). The weighing of evidence and the determinants of 
confidence, Cognitive Psychology, 24(3): 411–435. 
[24] Hackbarth, D. (2004). Managerial Optimism, Overconfidence, and Capital Structure 




[25] Hackbarth, D. (2009). Determinants of Corporate Borrowing: A Behavioral Perspective, 
SSRN Working Paper.  
[26] Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1995). “Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims 
in Constraining Management, American Economic Review 85 (3): 567-585. 
[27] Hayward, M. L. A., & Hambrick, D. C. (1997). Explaining the premiums paid for large 
acquisitions: Evidence of CEO hubris, Administrative Science Quarterly, 42(1): 103–127. 
[28] Heaton, J. B. (2002). Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance, Financial 
Management Tampa, 31(2): 33-45. 
[29] Hirshleifer, D., Low, A., & Teoh, S. H. (2012). Are Overconfident CEOs Better 
Innovators?，Germany: University Library of Munich, P: 1457-1498. 
[30] Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 
American Economic Review, 6: 323-329. 
[31] Jensen, M. C., & Meekling, H. (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial, 3: 305-360. 
[32] Kruger, J. (1999). Lake Wobegon be gone! The "below-average effect" and the egocentric 
nature of comparative ability judgments,  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77(2): 
221–232. 
[33] Larwood, L., & Whittaker, W. (1977). Managerial Myopia: Self-serving Biases in 
Organizational Planning, Journal of Applied Psychology, 62: 94-198. 
[34] Langer, J. (1975). The Illusion of Control, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
32: 311-328. 
[35] Landier, A., & Thesmar, D. (2009). Financial Contracting with Optimistic Entrepreneurs, 
Review of Financial Studies, 22(1): 117–150. 
[36] Lichtenstein, S., Fischhoff, B., & Slovic, P. (1977). Knowing with certainty: The 
appropriateness of extreme confidence, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 3(4): 552–564. 
[37] Lin, Y., Hu, S., & Chen, M. (2005). Managerial Optimism and Corporate Investment: 




[38] Lin, B. X., Michayluk, D., & Oppenheimer, H. R. (2008). Hubris amongst Japanese 
Bidders, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 16: 121–159. 
[39] Liu, Y., & Taffler, R. (2008). CEO Ocerconfidence in M&A Decision Making and Its 
Impact on Firm Performance, SSRN Working Paper. 
[40] Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2005). CEO overconfidence and corporate investment, The 
Journal of Finance, 60(6): 2661-2700. 
[41] Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2008). Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and 
the market’s reaction, Journal of Financial Economics, (89): 20-43. 
[42] March, J, G., & Shapira, Z. (1987). Managerial Perspective on Risk and Risk Taking, 
Managerment Science, 33(11): 1404-1418. 
[43] Moore, J.L., & Kim, M. S. (2013). Information needs and information‐seeking behaviour 
analysis of primary care physicians and nurses: a literature review, Health Info Libr J, (30): 
178-190. 
[44] Mohamed, E. B., Fairchild, R., & Bouri, A. (2014). Investment cash flow sensitivity under 
managerial optimism: new evidence from NYSE panel data firms, Journal of Economics, 
Finance and Administrative Sciences, 19(36): 11-18. 
[45] Nisbett, R. E., & Ross, Lee. (1980). Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of 
Social Judgment, Prentice-Hall. 
[46] Oliver, B. R. (2005). The Impact of Management Confidence on Capital Structure,  SSRN 
Working Paper.  
[47] Polk, A., Christopher, B., & Paola, H. (2004). Does CEO Over Confidence Affect 
Management Forecasting and Subsequent Earnings Management, SSRN Working Paper. 
 
[48] Paredes, T. A. (2004). Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Is CEO Overconfidence the 
Product of Corporate Governance?, Social Science Electronic Publishing. 
[49] Richardson, S. A. (2006). Over-Investment of Free Cash Flow, SSRN Working Paper.  





[51] Russo, J. E., & Schoemaker, P. J. H. (1992). Managing Overconfidence, Sloan 
Management Review, 33(2): 7-17. 
[52] Schrand, C. M., & Zechman, S. C. (2012). Executive Overconfidence and the Slippery 
Slope to Financial Misreporting, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 53(1-2): 311-329. 
[53] Shefrin, H. (2001). Behavior Corporate Finance, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 
(14): 113-126.  
[54] Shefrin, H. (2007). Behavioral Corporate Finance. Decisions that Create Value, McGraw- 
Hill/Irwin.   
[55] Slothouber, S. (2010). The influence of CEO overconfidence on firm value, 
Tilburg: Tilburg School of Economics and Management. 
[56] Thaler, R., & Johnson, E. J. (1990). The Effects of Prior Outcomes on Risky Choice, 
Managerment Science, (6): 643-776. 
[57] Weinstein, N. (1980). Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, (39): 806-82. 
[58] 蔡吉甫.(2009). 管理层持股、自由现金流量与过度投资, 云南财经大学学报, 25 (5): 
78-83. 
[59] 陈其安，杨秀苔. (2007). 基于代理人过度自信的委托-代理关系模型研究, 管理工程
学报,021(001): 110-116. 
[60] 高敬忠, 韩传模, 王英. (2013). 控股股东行为与管理层业绩预告披露策略-以我国 A
股上市公司为例,审计与经济研究, (04): 77-85. 
[61] 郝颖, 刘星, 林朝南.(2005). 我国上市公司高管人员过度自信与投资决策的实证研
究,中国管理科学,(5): 142-148. 
 
[62] 卢君生, 张顺明, 朱艳阳. (2017). 过度自信的 CEO 影响高新技术企业的研发效率吗,
金融与经济, (004): 61-67. 





[64] 姜付秀, 张敏, 陆正飞.(2009). 管理者过度自信、企业扩张与财务困境,经济研究,(1): 
131-143. 
[65] 江伟. (2010). 行业薪酬基准与管理者薪酬增长-基于中国上市公司的实证分析, 金
融研究, (004): 144-159. 
[66] 江晓东.(2005). 投资者过度自信理论与实证研究综述 , 外国经济与管理,27(009): 
59-64. 
[67] 吉姗姗, 王福胜. (2017). 管理层会使报告盈余满足自己发布的盈余预测吗?-基于闭
区间预测的实证分析, 财经论丛, 217(02): 69-77. 
[68] 李永壮, 闫国栋, 宁晓林. (2015). 管理者自信与企业绩效-基于中国中小板上市企业
面板数据的实证研究, 华中师范大学学报:人文社会科学版, (5): 46-54. 
[69] 饶育蕾, 汪玉英.(2006).中国上市公司大股东对投资影响的实证研究,南开管理评
论,(5): 67-73. 
[70] 孙光国, 赵健宇.(2014).产权性质差异、管理层过度自信与会计稳健性,会计研究,, (5): 
48-66. 
[71] 汪德华,周晓艳.(2007).管理者过度自信与企业投资扭曲,山西财经大学学报, (4): 60-
69. 
[72] 王霞, 张敏,于富生.(2008).管理者过度自信与企业投资行为异化, 南开管理评论,(2): 
77-83. 
[73] 王周伟.(2006).经理人自信和公司投资-基于我国上市公司财务信息的实证研究, 现
代会计与审计, (2): 35-77. 
[74] 王 俊 秋 . (2013). Earnings Decrease, Fair Value Accounting and Managerial 
Compensation Incentive, 上海经济研究, 025 (007): 115-127,137. 
 
[75] 王铁男, 刘丹和崔亚莉(2014). 管理者过度自信对企业连续并购行为的影响研究，
anniversary.paper.edu:cn. 
[76] 韦欣. (2011). 我国垄断行业高管薪酬实证研究, 财会通讯, (009): 119-121. 





[78] 许致维. (2013). 管理者过度自信导致企业过度投资的实证分析——来自中国制造
业上市公司 2008—2011 年的经验证据, 财经科学, (09): 51-60. 
[79] 闫永海, 孔玉生. (2010). 总经理过度自信与企业并购决策,中国财务学年会.  
[80] 叶蓓, 袁建国.(2008). 管理者信心、企业投资与企业价值, 中国软科学, (2): 97-108. 
[81] 严志辉,等.(2006). 基于过度自信的多任务委托-代理模型扩展研究, 系统工程，(02): 
23-26. 
[82] 杨扬, 马元驹, 朱小平. (2011). 管理者过度自信与企业绩效, 天津商业大学学报, 
031(006): 29-35. 
[83] 余明桂, 夏新平, 邹振松.(2006). 管理者过度自信与企业激进负债行为, 管理世界 
(08). 
[84] 张然, 张鹏. (2011). 中国上市公司自愿业绩预告动机研究, 中国会计评论. 
[85] 张花云. (2017). 管理者过度自信对中国上市公司跨国并购绩效的影响, 东华大学. 
[86] 施东晖.(2006). 现代金融学前沿, 上海交通大学出版社. 




















Table A-1 The Total Quantity and Total Amount of Mergers and Acquisitions of Chinese 
Enterprises in 2012-2018 
Amount: 





Quantity Amount Quantity Amount Quantity Amount Quantity Amount 
Transactio









Domestic 2,667 83.6 2,704 138.2 4,180 225.6 4,821 422.1 4,804 329.7 5,111 376.9 4,778 332.0 




2,953 92.2 2,979 152.3 4,534 247.8 5,137 435.7 5,141 340.2 5,366 391.3 4,956 352.6 
Financial 



























41 35.8 55 35.3 78 25.9 80 27.6 115 66.5 101 28.1 64 21.1 
Private 
enterprise 124 10.1 118 10.6 145 13.5 207 21.0 612 116.3 467 59.9 310 51.1 
Financial 















166 12.2 164 9.0 215 20.7 199 25.0 281 18.2 243 12.9 227 24.5 
Total 4,116 186.5 4,446 242.7 6,899 377.0 9,421 695.5 
11,40
9 770.1 9,839 676.6 
10,88
7 678.3 
















Q1 217 21.9% 186 16,794.66 33.0% 90.29 
Q2 237 23.9% 197 15,710.46 30.8% 79.75 
Q3 249 25.1% 232 6,835.81 13.4% 29.46 
Q4 288 29.1% 268 11,421.42 22.5% 42.62 
Total 991 100% 883 50,762.34 100% 57.49 
Data source: Wind information, Guotai Junan database 
 
Table A-3 M&A Transactions of Chinese Listed Companies in 2012 













Domestic M&A  837 84.5% 771 17,279.02 34.0% 22.41 
Overseas M&A 112 11.3% 88 29,825.21 58.8% 338.92 
Foreign capital M&A 42 4.2% 24 3,658.11 7.2% 152.42 
Total 991 100% 883 50,762.34 100% 57.49 
Data source: Wind information, Guotai Junan database 
 
Table A-4 M&A Transactions of Chinese Listed Companies in 2013 
(By type of M&A) 
Type Number 
of cases 





Proportion Average M&A 
amount（U$m） 
Domestic M&A 904 89.1% 848 28,558.29 39.3% 33.68 
Overseas M&A 80 7.9% 64 32,179.04 44.3% 502.80 
Foreign capital M&A 31 3.0% 20 11,885.24 16.4% 594.26 
Total 1,015 100% 932 72,622.57 100% 77.92 














M&A data of Listed Companies 
in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Markets from 2012 to 2013 
Year 
企业自由现金流量
FCFF 净利润 Net profit 
公司所在
省份 证监会行业名称 股票简称 
公告





161,601,673,671.4140 13,510,780,000.0000 广东省 金融业 平安银行 
2012 583,954,444.1592 15,662,588,423.0600 广东省 房地产业 万科 A 
2012 -42,239,660.6321 7,814,225.2900 广东省 制造业 国农科技 
2012 -136,044,582.7569 22,021,617.8900 广东省 
水利、环境和公共设施
管理业 世纪星源 
2013 -907,303,701.5496 698,009,106.0000 广东省 房地产业 深振业 A 
2013 15,340,371.9036 18,830,603.4600 广东省 房地产业 全新好 
2013 35,045,015.7480 22,757,953.9400 北京 制造业 神州高铁 
2013 -544,752,031.3316 444,151,234.1700 广东省 综合 中国宝安 
2013 -110,876,820.4819 3,810,759.8000 广东省 建筑业 美丽生态 
2013 -950,832,545.3029 1,675,314,397.0000 广东省 制造业 南玻 A 
2013 79,730,044.6351 35,207,822.8200 广东省 房地产业 沙河股份 
2012 55,914,925.8904 45,438,574.8600 广东省 制造业 深康佳 A 
2013 1,283,568,996.8508 59,843,937.0600 广东省 制造业 深康佳 A 
2013 -887,736,335.2613 1,575,858,760.0200 广东省 制造业 深中华 A 
2013 2,918,391.6706 7,849,904.0000 广东省 建筑业 神州长城 
2012 -246,093,634.3033 74,063,925.0800 广东省 制造业 深深宝 A 
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2013 -149,545,173.5049 45,214,229.5600 广东省 制造业 深深宝 A 
2013 -87,751,456.2800 -6,517,401.4400 广东省 制造业 深华发 A 
2012 23,555,093.5425 8,452,148.4800 广东省 制造业 深科技 
2013 264,372,102.4047 158,874,515.1500 广东省 制造业 深科技 
2012 -166,565,071.0329 615,769,510.0000 广东省 
交通运输、仓储和邮政
业 深赤湾 A 
2012 -151,376,500.3381 5,131,099.0900 广东省 制造业 深天地 A 
2013 42,501,182.0583 11,822,530.0000 广东省 制造业 深天地 A 
2012 1,139,845,518.0874 4,277,519,103.4900 广东省 房地产业 
招商地产(退
市) 
2013 -4,132,995,593.7494 5,508,314,166.0600 广东省 房地产业 
招商地产(退
市) 
2012 2,640,302.6298 971,919.1900 广东省 批发和零售业 特力 A 
2013 -8,880,328.3669 3,017,976.2000 广东省 批发和零售业 特力 A 
2012 -57,586,789.5567 115,659,865.8300 广东省 批发和零售业 飞亚达 A 
2012 -1,414,836,564.8257 1,136,475,669.0900 广东省 
电力、热力、燃气及水
生产和供应业 深圳能源 
2013 3,426,396,423.3038 1,736,630,977.1100 广东省 
电力、热力、燃气及水
生产和供应业 深圳能源 
2012 280,169,108.8152 483,681,835.5200 广东省 批发和零售业 国药一致 
2013 104,374,863.1612 228,317,758.1300 广东省 房地产业 深深房 A 
2012 -1,529,446.2400 -3,689,015.6100 吉林省 制造业 富奥股份 
2013 -862,989,954.2953 590,379,057.1800 吉林省 制造业 富奥股份 
2012 1,523,538,646.6690 674,171,976.3100 广东省 房地产业 中粮地产 
2013 -2,237,643,477.2590 919,186,495.2200 广东省 房地产业 中粮地产 
2012 51,495,099.2969 178,982,041.0900 广东省 批发和零售业 深桑达 A 
2013 -82,482,517.9900 3,486,206.6400 广东省 住宿和餐饮业 
新都退(退
市) 
2012 390,510,553.4900 -636,052,363.9400 江苏省 
水利、环境和公共设施
管理业 中国天楹 
2013 -916,660,273.2600 1,131,546,995.3300 江苏省 
水利、环境和公共设施
管理业 中国天楹 
2013 -23,266,962.8977 114,888,220.0500 广东省 房地产业 华联控股 
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2013 -344,960,921.2881 73,379,180.3600 广东省 
电力、热力、燃气及水生产
和供应业 深南电 A 
2013 
-
2,663,767,178.7123 2,634,498,000.0000 广东省 制造业 中集集团 
2012 -612,668,036.8571 194,099,382.8500 广东省 建筑业 东旭蓝天 
2013 -680,846,275.4564 102,864,912.3300 广东省 建筑业 东旭蓝天 
2012 340,803,414.9036 411,880,264.4300 广东省 房地产业 中洲控股 
2013 162,262,791.9476 405,502,224.1500 广东省 房地产业 中洲控股 
2012 222,900,747.0304 435,495,238.6000 广东省 房地产业 中航地产 
2013 
-
1,815,307,644.0346 499,425,238.1700 广东省 房地产业 中航地产 
2013 -447,502,110.3591 47,222,590.9700 广东省 制造业 深纺织 A 
2012 
-
2,462,144,896.4372 778,048,233.1000 北京 房地产业 泛海控股 
2013 
-
5,414,444,281.9267 1,179,033,099.5000 北京 房地产业 泛海控股 
2012 -163,513,197.2050 30,263,174.3500 广东省 制造业 康达尔 
2013 -52,706,374.1610 -9,938,196.9800 广东省 制造业 康达尔 
2012 262,973,057.4905 170,730,071.6200 广东省 制造业 德赛电池 
2013 -370,983,059.1607 275,036,663.6600 广东省 制造业 德赛电池 
2013 881,937,308.8959 285,538,393.0000 广东省 制造业 深天马 A 
2012 173,672,116.7655 6,443,242.3800 广东省 制造业 方大集团 
2012 -250,304,791.6300 -16,097,351.1100 广东省 房地产业 皇庭国际 
2013 2,153,201,817.0182 3,873,341,158.2900 广东省 房地产业 皇庭国际 
2012 -73,256,811.4811 55,262,633.4800 广东省 租赁和商务服务业 深赛格 
2013 -66,589,732.5539 72,798,945.5500 广东省 租赁和商务服务业 深赛格 
2012 
-
3,495,821,241.1202 19,933,416.1700 辽宁省 制造业 华锦股份 
2012 639,940,232.5250 533,992,385.6700 广东省 制造业 中金岭南 
2013 -700,458,521.0691 421,061,684.2800 广东省 制造业 中金岭南 
2012 
-





2,011,769,709.8085 215,868,717.7300 广东省 租赁和商务服务业 农产品 
2012 878,380,174.4325 282,894,726.5600 广东省 批发和零售业 深圳华强 
2013 981,264,513.8283 406,031,046.2500 广东省 批发和零售业 深圳华强 
2012 7,605,892,000.0000 
-
2,604,621,000.0000 广东省 制造业 中兴通讯 
2013 -580,704,754.4400 -762,869,795.0500 广东省 制造业 中国长城 
2013 -580,704,754.4400 -762,869,795.0500 广东省 制造业 中国长城 
2013 -580,704,754.4400 -762,869,795.0500 广东省 制造业 中国长城 
2012 -128,184,339.2400 3,166,051.0800 广东省 制造业 华控赛格 
2013 16,200,900.9700 -37,201,394.2900 广东省 制造业 华控赛格 
2013 16,200,900.9700 -37,201,394.2900 广东省 制造业 华控赛格 
2012 6,561,208,136.8254 4,056,692,255.4100 广东省 房地产业 华侨城 A 
2013 5,906,383,872.3557 4,956,142,720.1600 广东省 房地产业 华侨城 A 
2012 -94,043,907.4328 54,624,143.5500 广东省 制造业 特发信息 
2012 -152,123,006.4689 101,081,761.6100 广东省 批发和零售业 海王生物 
2013 -337,383,467.3238 229,313,650.9300 广东省 批发和零售业 海王生物 
2013 693,699,381.1617 509,046,132.3300 广东省 交通运输、仓储和邮政业 深圳机场 
2013 761,733,317.7880 378,422,925.1800 广东省 建筑业 天健集团 
2013 92,020,836.0372 68,327,644.4100 广东省 批发和零售业 广聚能源 
2013 -768,422,007.5382 194,555,418.2200 广东省 交通运输、仓储和邮政业 中信海直 
2012 
-
1,233,187,613.6930 1,272,710,000.0000 广东省 制造业 TCL集团 
2013 
-
5,594,963,502.5037 2,884,689,000.0000 广东省 制造业 TCL集团 
2012 512,699,912.9886 44,101,282.0500 北京 批发和零售业 中成股份 
2012 -26,482,334.0054 18,091,742.3600 安徽省 制造业 丰原药业 
2013 -30,642,045.6337 27,188,465.6500 安徽省 制造业 丰原药业 
2012 357,059,982.8880 1,554,186.0200 四川省 制造业 川化股份 
94 
 
2013 -164,728,281.9400 -712,054,812.0900 四川省 制造业 川化股份 
2013 551,057,488.1092 255,445,611.2400 浙江省 文化、体育和娱乐业 华数传媒 
2012 -1,711,451,175.1747 7,528,964,114.6600 湖南省 制造业 中联重科 
2013 -2,121,987,482.3360 3,951,881,334.2700 湖南省 制造业 中联重科 
2012 -392,628,919.6421 11,700,295.9100 河北省 制造业 常山北明 
2012 -53,937,123.7795 101,251,349.0700 
新疆维吾尔
自治区 批发和零售业 国际实业 
2013 -234,999,295.4822 330,610,870.4600 江苏省 
电力、热力、燃气及水生
产和供应业 东方市场 
2012 -509,286,565.0712 3,234,266,548.6800 山东省 制造业 潍柴动力 
2012 -144,235,806.9398 569,535,842.8200 河南省 制造业 许继电气 
2013 612,000,773.6224 770,173,283.3000 河南省 制造业 许继电气 
2012 -1,054,981,133.3799 137,982,044.8800 河北省 制造业 冀东水泥 
2013 2,269,935,869.6221 198,723,998.0200 河北省 制造业 冀东水泥 
2012 -2,163,321,404.0868 2,696,542,868.3600 北京 房地产业 金融街 
2013 -4,349,593,128.1671 3,520,034,870.8100 北京 房地产业 金融街 
2013 -50,748,210.6574 64,005,172.9100 山西省 制造业 ST生化 
2012 -25,446,304.6618 173,186,132.8200 江西省 制造业 华意压缩 
2013 -347,860,191.1166 253,682,222.0400 江西省 制造业 华意压缩 
2012 62,121,284.7100 -139,357,037.8800 山东省 
电力、热力、燃气及水生
产和供应业 胜利股份 
2013 -203,942,983.1400 50,867,110.7000 山东省 
电力、热力、燃气及水生
产和供应业 胜利股份 
2012 35,998,913.8193 4,839,869.1200 青海省 制造业 藏格控股 
2013 -43,355,977.0249 16,411,820.8800 青海省 制造业 藏格控股 
2012 50,012,233.6509 80,584,201.2200 山东省 综合 山东地矿 
2013 5,518,054.2817 127,319,232.5200 山东省 综合 山东地矿 
2012 -1,333,882,329.4725 33,838,540.5300 辽宁省 制造业 沈阳机床 




2013 -251,138,989.4849 168,777,349.1200 浙江省 批发和零售业 英特集团 
2012 -9,617,974,475.6411 630,820,520.0400 
新疆维吾尔
自治区 租赁和商务服务业 渤海金控 
2013 -11,560,571,375.8082 1,333,844,000.0000 
新疆维吾尔
自治区 租赁和商务服务业 渤海金控 
2012 341,962,544.1332 459,182,487.7000 安徽省 批发和零售业 合肥百货 
2013 398,970,865.7437 474,269,069.6900 安徽省 批发和零售业 合肥百货 
2012 -1,017,187,696.5019 378,836,167.4600 江苏省 制造业 小天鹅 A 
2013 244,078,286.3939 474,757,699.7900 江苏省 制造业 小天鹅 A 
2012 163,041,978.0714 155,369,054.3300 湖南省 批发和零售业 通程控股 
2012 -104,793,231.2100 8,514,650.2000 吉林省 制造业 吉林化纤 
2012 -114,089,320.2927 110,184,372.9300 江苏省 
电力、热力、燃气及水生
产和供应业 南京公用 
2013 -67,995,368.1551 97,036,933.3300 江苏省 
电力、热力、燃气及水生
产和供应业 南京公用 
2013 553,594,026.8929 200,448,742.4700 湖北省 制造业 湖北宜化 
2013 286,998,337.3417 49,966,891.5400 
内蒙古自治
区 采矿业 兴业矿业 
2012 423,595,561.8974 116,424,279.5400 湖南省 住宿和餐饮业 华天酒店 
2013 -1,304,248,384.6901 111,332,397.5500 湖南省 住宿和餐饮业 华天酒店 
2013 40,546,258.1700 100,050,044.7800 广东省 交通运输、仓储和邮政业 粤高速 A 
2012 -2,404,275,964.3400 46,686,257.0700 山东省 制造业 晨鸣纸业 
2013 1,292,480,161.2375 690,353,237.6200 山东省 制造业 晨鸣纸业 
2012 -1,851,969,316.3929 232,214,725.6800 山东省 建筑业 山东路桥 
 
 
